Effect of Foreign Antitrust Laws on United States Business by Goldstein, E. Ernest
SMU Law Review
Volume 12 | Issue 4 Article 1
1958
Effect of Foreign Antitrust Laws on United States
Business
E. Ernest Goldstein
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
E. Ernest Goldstein, Effect of Foreign Antitrust Laws on United States Business, 12 Sw L.J. 405 (1958)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol12/iss4/1
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
VOLUME XII FALL, 1958 NUMBER 4
EFFECT OF FOREIGN ANTITRUST LAWS




N 1938, it could have been said that an American businessman
operating outside of the North American area was generally free
to do everything that he was not free to do under the Sherman' and
Clayton Acts' back home. In only a few countries, such as Norway,'
he might have to register some of his restrictive agreements, but he
could be assured that, in general, such registration would not be a
real hindrance.!
The picture now has changed. The change is not a complete one,
but it is real and gives every indication of continuing. It is not sug-
gested that the Sherman and Clayton Acts have been incorporated
into the legal systems of our friends, but something has happened
which should put every American with a foreign affiliate, subsid-
iary, or licensing agreement on his guard.'
II. UNITED STATES RESPONSIBILITY FOR FOREIGN LEGISLATION
Although this new trend toward control of restrictive business
practices and cartels does represent a response to public demands
" From a paper presented at the Southwestern Legal Foundation Institute on the Anti-
trust Laws (1958) and published with the permission of Matthew Bender & Company, pub-
lisher.
* B.B.A., City College of New York; LL.B., Yale University; Associate Professor of
Law, University of Texas.
126 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1952).
238 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1952).
aLaw of March 12, 1926, On the Control of Restrictions on Competition and Un-
reasonable Prices, as amended, June 30, 1932, and June 24, 1938; see notes 27 and 28 infra.
4 Boycotts were considered legal in the cigarette industry, Trustkontrollen, No. 12, 1928,
and in the textile industry, Trustkontrollen, No. 38, 1932. See article entitled "Business
Disputes," Aftenposten (Oslo), June 25, 1953, which says in part: "It looks as though the
Price Directorate simply has filed the reports on restrictive agreements which have been
received through the years." See also editorial entitled "Price Act and Competition,"
Arbeiderbladet (Oslo), Sept. 30, 1953.
'Even Switzerland, long considered the bulwark of cartellism, seems to desire some form
of control. A control proposition was rejected by the voters in January 1958, because of
the form of the proposition and not because of its purpose. Foreign Commerce Weekly,
Vol. 59, No. 13, March 31, 1958, p. 3.
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in the free world, it is well to recognize that the official policy of
our Government has been very instrumental in creating the new
climate. An understanding of the role played by our Government
would seem helpful in evaluating the impact and probable direction
of this new movement toward control of restrictive practices, as
well as our government's attitude if called upon to assist American
enterprises operating abroad.
In part, our efforts represent a sort of self-defense. Cartels are
often able to subsidize export programs which directly affect our
domestic economy and our own export program. Wisely or not,
we have enacted a variety of legislation to provide a hoped-for pro-
tection against such an infection of our economy." This legislation
served to notify the rest of the world that we were not willing to
let our competitive system deteriorate under the impact of the grow-
ing trend elsewhere toward cartellism. The shift from a laissez-faire
system to a privately regulated economy was for the most part a
product of the instability that followed World War I. The same
forces which eventually impelled us to experiment with the National
Recovery Act8 had effectively changed the form of business conduct
in other parts of the world beginning with the depressions and in-
flations of the 1920's. Our legislation did little more than serve no-
tice of our thinking.
As our entry into World War II approached, we discovered that
much of our defense effort was hamstrung by cartel activities. Sev-
eral congressional committees, notably the Bone Committee,' the
T. N. E. C.," and the various committees concerned with military
preparedness" uncovered specific evidence of the price we were pay-
ing for the affiliation of American business with foreign cartels.
The executive branch of our Government played its role in bring-
ing further evidence to the fore through the antitrust litigation
'Wilson Tariff Act, 28 Stat. $70 (1894), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §5 8-11 (1952);
Antidumping Provisions Revenue Act of 1916, 39 Stat. 798, 15 U.S.C. SS 71-76 (1952);
Unfair Import Practices Tariff Act of 1930, 46 Stat. 703, 19 U.S.C. § 1937 (1952);
Webb-Pomerene Export Trade Act, 40 Stat. 516 (1918), 15 U.S.C. S§ 61-65 (1952); and
others.
'Stocking and Watkins, Cartels or Competition? 32-67 (1948).
'48 Stat. 195 (1933), as amended, 49 Stat. 375, 15 U.S.C. SS 701-12 (1952).
'Hearings on S. 2303 and S. 2491 Before the Senate Committee on Patents, 77th Cong.
(1942). See, e.g., pts. 5, 7.
"°Temporary National Economic Committee; see Gilbert & Dickens, Export Prices and
Export Cartels (TNEC Monograph No. 6, 1940); Domeratsky, Callman, Roman, Cover, and
Miller, Regulation of Economic Activities in Foreign Countries (TNEC Monograph No. 40,
1941).
" Hearings on S. 2721 Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Military
Affairs (on technological mobilization), 77th Cong. (1942), see, e.g., pt. 11; Hearings Be-
fore a Special Senate Committee Pursuant to S. Res. 71 (Investigation of the national de-
fense program), 77th Cong. (1942), see especially pt. 11.
[Vol. 12
FOREIGN ANTITRUST LAWS
which involved overseas restrictive business activities affecting our
foreign commerce."
Out of this welter of material emerged a policy which began to
be consistently expressed at the close of the war. In chapter five of
the Havana Charter 3 is found a clear statement of views which have
not failed to impress responsible leaders in other countries, 4 despite
the fact that the Charter never became a living instrument. The
post-war series of Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation
spell out a bilateral policy on restrictive practices." The bilateral
agreements with participating countries in the Marshall Plan made
clear our determination that the recovery program was not to be
frustrated by restrictive business practices. At the same time, the
Congress continued to express its concern by investigating further
" See cases discussed in Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study
the Antitrust Laws, pp. 65-91, March 31, 1955.
1a U.S. Dep't of State Pub. No. 3206, Havana Charter for an International Trade Or-
ganization, pp. 86-92 (1948).
"See unpublished manuscript by Wilhelm Thagaard, Director of the Norwegian Price
Directorate, International Conference on Restrictive Business Practices, Chicago, Jan. 15,
1958, p. 17.
"E.g., in Treaty with Israel, Aug. 23, 1951, 5 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 785, T.I.A.S. No. 2948;
Treaty with Greece, Aug 3, 1951, 5 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 1829, T.I.A.S. No. 3057; Treaty with
Ireland, Jan. 21, 1950, 1 U.S.T. & O.I.A. 785, T.I.A.S. No. 2155; Treaty with Italy, Feb.
2, 1948, 63 Stat. B2255, T.I.A.S. No. 1965, appears some version of the following text:
The two parties agree that business practices which restrain competition, limit access
to markets or foster monopolistic control, and which are engaged in or made effective
by one or more private or public commercial enterprises or by combination, agreement
or other arrangement among such enterprises may have harmful effects upon commerce
between their respective territories. Accordingly, each party agrees upon the request of
the other party to consult with respect to any such practices and to take such measures
as it deems appropriate with a view to eliminating such harmful effects.
"E.g., see Treaty of Economic Cooperation with the United Kingdom, July 6, 1948,
art. II, para. 3, 62 Stat. 2596, T.I.A.S. No. 1795, which reads as follows:
The Government of the United Kingdom will take the measures which it deems ap-
propriate, and will co-operate with other participating countries, to prevent, on the
part of private or public commercial enterprises, business practices or business arrange-
ments affecting international trade which restrain competition, limit access to markets
or foster monopolistic control whenever such practices or arrangements have the effect
of interfering with the achievement of the joint programme of European recovery.
See also 62 Stat. 2607 (1948) (Annex-Interpretative Notes) as follows:
3. It is understood that the business practices and business arrangements referred to in
paragraph 3 of Article II means-
(a) Fixing prices, terms or conditions to be observed in dealing with others in the
purchase, sale or lease of any product;
(b) Excluding enterprises from, or allocating or dividing, any territorial market or
field of business activity, or allocating customers, or fixing sales quotas or pur-
chase quotas;
(c) Discriminating against particular enterprises;
(d) Limiting production or fixing production quotas;
(e) Preventing by agreement the development or application of technology or in-
vention whether patented or unpatented;
(f) Extending the use of rights under patents, trade marks or copyrights granted
by either country to matters which, according to its laws and regulations, are
not within the scope of such grants, or to products or conditions of production,
use or sale which are likewise not the subject of such grants; and
(g) Such other practices as the two Governments may agree to include.
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into cartel problems,"' and finally, specific legislation designed to
discourage restrictive business practices and to encourage free com-
petition in the countries benefiting from foreign aid was enacted.'
This legislation which led to the creation of the European Produc-
tivity Agency as an organ of the Organization for European Eco-
nomic Cooperation and which brought into being the Productivity
programs in Western Europe has probably been the most direct in-
fluence leading to new legislation designed to curb anti-competitive
activities. Of course, other influences have also been at work, such
as the occupations of Germany and Japan which have set a pattern.'
Through the Productivity programs has come the educational basis
for popular support of legislation designed to curb private regimen-
tation of the economy. The education has been direct in the form
of demonstrated benefits to consumers, labor, and management
where experimentation with competitive production and pricing has
been permitted." Further, study missions to the United States have
17 See Department of State, Select Senate Committee on Small Business, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess., Foreign Legislation Concerning Monopoly and Cartel Practices (Subcomm. Print No. 5,
1952); id., Hearings on Monopoly and Cartels (Subcomm. Print 1952).
"SSection 516(a) of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, 67 Stat. 152, 22 U.S.C. S 1667
(1952), reads as follows:
It is declared to be the policy of the Congress that this Act shall be administered in
such a way as (1) to eliminate the barriers to, and provide the incentives for, a
steadily increased participation of free private enterprise in developing the resources of
foreign countries consistent with the policies of this Act, (2) to the extent that it is
feasible and does not interfere with the achievement of the purposes set forth in this
Act, to discourage the cartel and monopolistic business practices prevailing in certain
countries receiving aid under this Act which result in restricting production and in-
creasing prices, and to encourage where suitable competition and productivity, and
(3) to encourage where suitable the development and strengthening of the free labor
union movements as the collective bargaining agencies of labor within such countries.
Section 9(c) of the Mutual Security Act of 1952, 66 Stat. 141, 22 U.S.C. § 1513 (1952),
amending S 115 of the Economic Cooperation Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 137, as amended, 22
U.S.C. S 1933 (1952), reads as follows:
(1) $100,000,000 shall, to the maximum extent practicable consistent with the accom-
plishment of the policies and purposes of the Mutual Securities Act of 1951, as amended,
be expended in such manner and subject to such agreements as may be necessary to
assure that the amounts of local currencies deposited under subsection (b) (6) as a
result of such expenditure shall be used exclusively, in accordance with principles
developed by the Administrator, to establish revolving funds which shall be available
for making loans, and otherwise to carry out programs in furtherance of the objectives
of section 516 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, with a view to stimulating free
enterprise and the expansion of the economies of those countries with equitable sharing
of the benefits of increased production and productivity between consumers, workers,
and owners; and (2) the Director for Mutual Security is authorized to transfer not
exceeding $2,500,000 to the Organization for European Economic Cooperation, to be
used on terms and conditions to be specified by the Director in order to promote the
objectives of Section 516 of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, as amended.
"9E.g., Law on Prohibition of Excessive Concentration of German Economic Power,
Law No. 56, Jan. 28, 1947, Military Government Gazette, Germany, Issue C, April 1, 1947;
and Control of Restrictive Trade Practices in Japan, Restrictive Trade Practices Specialists
Study Team, Japan Productivity Center, Tokyo, 1958, p. 3.
' E.g., Commissariat General a la Productivite, Objectifs et Realisations, pp. 76-84
(Paris) (1956).
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taken back to Europe and Asia converts to our notions of com-
petition."
Against this background of official policy, one must measure the
actual conduct of some American enterprises abroad. As will be seen,
some American firms have attempted to be the noblest Romans
operating in Rome. Some few firms have, by their conduct, cast
some doubt on the true intentions of the American Government
and unwittingly provided fuel for the Communist propaganda ma-
chines." This has undoubtedly slowed the trend toward regulation
of restrictive practices in some areas, but the trend exists nonetheless.
Another factor militating against the full and early success of Ameri-
can efforts to convince our friends of the need for competition is
found in our import policy. Voluntary textile import limitations
have led to the re-establishment of export cartels in Japan, 3 agri-
cultural limitations have had similar results elsewhere,'' and the gen-
eral feeling in some foreign quarters is that only through the tech-
nique of an export cartel can there be compliance with our requests
for voluntary reduction of shipments to our shores. These facts must
be considered if we wish fairly to evaluate the efforts made to con-
trol restrictive practices abroad. It is well to remind ourselves of
the dismal early years of the Sherman Act when hardly a case was
brought,"5 and contrast this with the surprising amount of energy
displayed in a short time abroad, which will be discussed later in
this Article.
'" Department of Commerce, Report of a Visit to the United States of a British Special-
ist Team on Industrial Engineering (1954), wherein it is stated:
One of the three factors of over-riding importance causing the United States to lead
the world in national wealth and productivity is the sharp and urgent competitiveness
of the U.S. economy. It is our opinion that, more than any other factor, competition
provides the drive for the more frequent analysis of costs and the application of indus-
trial engineering techniques in the United States, and the constant effort to achieve the
most economic usage of man, materials, machines and money.
Monopolies legislation in Britain should be considerably strengthened and its range ex-
tended to ensure competitive conditions. As a first step, we recommend Parliament to
consider enforcing by law that trade and industrial associations (and trades unions),
where they do not already do so, should publish any rules or agreements which bind
their members. This, in our opinion, is essential to attain greater efficiency and reduc-
tion of costs.
" E.g., Economie et Politique, Revue Marxiste d'Economie, La France et les Trusts,
Nos. 5. 6 (Paris) (1954).
"
3 Export Trading Law No. 299, Aug. 5, 1952, found in Laws and Regulations Con-
cerning Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Tokyo) (1952).
This is similar to Webb-Pomerene and legalizes export cartels under certain conditions. Law
188, 1953, amends the 1952 law, but does not affect the proposition for which it is cited;
see also article entitled "Japanese to Curb Textiles Export," N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1955.
"4 E.g., see article entitled "U.S. Trade Policy in Italy Aids Reds," N.Y. Times, Oct. 3,
1954, p. 9, col. 1.
2' Thorell, The Federal Antitrust Policy 369-500 (Stockholm) (1954).
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III. GENERAL OBSERVATIONS
Foreign legislation is of four types. The most common legislation
makes it obligatory upon parties to restrictive arrangements to re-
gister their arrangements with an administrative body. Dominant
firms must also, in many cases, register. No agreement or activity
is enforceable if not registered. The fact that the legislation, in one
way or another, represents the idea that there can be good restrictive
practices and good cartels makes the enforcement of the registration
procedures fairly simple. The second legislative approach is on an
enquiry basis. This legislation usually sets up a commission to in-
vestigate on its own initiative, or upon complaint, certain types
of practices or industry patterns of restriction. The commission may
then pass on the arrangements and invoke the aid of the courts in
terminating certain practices. In some cases the commission may
establish fair-trading rules for the industry similar to the trade prac-
tice activities of our Federal Trade Commission. In some countries
features of this type of legislation are combined with other types.
The third form of legislation is that directed against a single prac-
tice or a group of related practices which are made illegal subject
to certain exemptions. The fourth legislative approach is usually
limited to the international sphere. It calls for the suppression of
anti-competitive activities in somewhat general language that might
at first blush evoke a comparison with the Sherman Act.
Several further generalizations might be noted before proceeding
to an analysis of specific prototype legislation and its enforcement.
In practically every country the administrative agencies created by
the restrictive business practices legislation have broad powers. These
powers may include the right to negotiate the equivalent of consent
decrees without judicial or public scrutiny, the right to confiscate
profits, and the right to enjoin activities. In all but the few common-
law countries, the absence of a doctrine of stare decisis may mean
repetitious appellate or private litigation. This in turn enhances the
already broad powers of the administrative agencies, so that for most
purposes the administrative agency is judge, jury, and policeman as
well as prosecutor. Finally, one may consider the extent to which
the legislation in question, as a reaction to the rigidity of the private
anti-competitive system, implies greater governmental control of
business than even the severest critics of our antitrust laws claim
in this country.
In the space alloted it would be impossible to give a detailed anal-
ysis of the provisions of the more than twenty foreign legislative sit-
[Vol. 12
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uations of primary interest. Therefore, attention will be devoted
to four prime examples of different types of legislation: the Nor-
wegian, Irish, French, and the European Coal and Steel Community
and Common Market. After a discussion of the provisions and de-
velopment of these systems, some attention will be given to high
spots of other legislative systems, and then, the case and administra-
tive law developments under the various systems. Norway, as the
oldest continuing compulsory registration system, provides the clear-
est picture of the evolutionary process involved in legislation. The
Irish Free State has a different approach which is of significance
because of its newness and the major effort being made to induce
American investment and production in that country. France repre-
sents an entirely new approach to restrictive practices and is signi-
ficant because of the surprising results thus far. Finally, the Coal
and Steel Community and the Common Market Treaties represent
an international approach of potential significance to American in-
vestors and licensors.
IV. REPRESENTATIVE FOREIGN LEGISLATION
A. Norway
Norway may boast of the longest history of legislation in the
cartel field outside of North America. In 1920, as an amendment to
a wartime price control law, Norway enacted legislation designed
to control, as distinguished from prohibitory legislation, restrictive
business practices, cartels, and monopolies. "s This early legislation
provided for compulsory registration of restrictive associations,
agreements, and what are termed dominant enterprises. Control and
supervision of cartels was afforded by registration, and intervention
in cartel affairs was through price control.
Permanent legislation, known as the Trust Control Act, was en-
acted in 1926," and with some amendments" it was the law until
June 26, 1953," when the present law came into being. The 1953
legislation has since been amplified and amended.'0 All of these acts,
"8See discussion of Law of Aug. 6, 1920, Notes et Etudes Documentaires, No. 1.622
(Paris), June 7, 1952, p. 10.
' See Report of the Ministry of Finance, The Price Act, Enclosure No. I to Oslo, Dis-
patch No. 786, June 3, 1954, p. 71.
2s Ibid. The amendments were Law of June 30, 1932, No. 2, and Law of June 24, 1938,
No. 23.
"'For an English language text, see U.N. EcoSoc Council Off. Rec. 19th Sess., Supp.
No. 3, at 61-73 (E/2671) (1954).
"See Thagaard, op. cit. supra note 14, at 8-9, 11-12, discussing the Royal Decree of
March 1956, prohibiting price and profit increases without Price Directorate approval, and
also discussing the Royal Decree of Oct. 18, 1957, prohibiting resale price maintenance
without Price Directorate approval.
195 8]
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as is usually the case, exempt trade unions from their operation,
but professional associations of doctors and lawyers do come under
the terms of the legislation."
The 1926 act was in force until the outbreak of World War II.
Trustkontrollen, the official publication of the Trust Control Office,
reported in 1938 and 1939 the annual box score of administrative
decisions under the 1926 act. These decisions included 18 findings
that cartel price or profit regulations were undesirable and there-
fore were to be discontinued. Eleven regulations regarding competi-
tion were ordered discontinued and 113 boycotts and exclusive agree-
ments were ordered terminated.
The formal authority to intervene was given to the Trust Control
Board, which acted in accordance with the recommendations of the
Trust Control Office. Its decisions were treated as precedents, despite
the general notion that stare decisis is not applicable to civil-law
administrative decisions. Thus, the effect of the decisions was wide-
spread, and the extent of the control activity is shown by the 3,381
revisions of the price lists reported in Trustkontrollen of 1926.
Despite this record, enforcement was not considered very effective
because of a loophole in the 1926 legislation which may be found
in similar legislation in other countries. Under the 1926 law, only
those agreements or arrangements of more than one year's duration
needed approval in order to be enforced. Agreements of shorter dur-
ation had to be registered, but they were not dependent on approval
in order to operate. Thus, arrangements could be made formally
to terminate within the statutory period, and then continued on the
basis of an "understanding."32 Nevertheless, registrations grew dur-
ing the life of the 1926 act.
At the beginning of 1929, 188 agreements and arrangements were
registered; at the beginning of 1939, 376 registrations were on the
books,3 and as of July 1957, the number registered was 780 which
included 502 restrictive associations, 200 restrictive arrangements
among enterprises which had not formed formal associations, and
78 dominant enterprises." In part, these new figures reflect the
stronger registration provisions of the present act as well as the
growth of the Norwegian economy. To a degree one may also infer
that neither the 1926 nor the 1953 legislation has served, or has
31 Law of June 26, 1953, arts. 2, 60.
32 Law of March 12, 1926, as amended, art. 16; see English language text, Restrictive
Business Practices, U.N. EcoSoc Council Off. Rec. 16th Sess., Supp. No. 1IB, at 161 et
seq. (E/2379/add. 2) (1953).
aaReport of the Ministry of Finance, The Price Act, Enclosure No. I to Oslo, Dis-
patch No. 786, June 3, 1954, p. 57.
" See Thagaard, op. cit. supra note 14, at 7.
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been intended to serve, as a complete deterrent to restrictive prac-
tices.
For the American interested in doing business in Norway, whether
in goods or services, it is important to know that all types of "busi-
ness activity" are subject to registration. Any formal or informal
arrangement that is intended to or does result in a restriction on
competition falls within the purview of the legislation."
For dominant enterprise registration the standards involve either
control, production, or dealing involving twenty-five per cent or
more of the relevant sector of the economy. In addition, those small-
er firms which are controlled by or connected with large foreign
enterprises or combinations must register. These dominant firms must
supply a variety of information as to their activities within Nor-
way.37 Thus, any affiliate or licensee of an American firm of any
size is required to register publicly its arrangements with the Ameri-
can firm insofar as they involve the internal Norwegian economy.
Further, as a matter of practice, the registration may require some
indication of activities outside of Norway when a foreign firm is
involved. The rationale for this is Norway's desire to be able to
participate properly in any international arrangement for the con-
trol of restrictive practices." The major administrative agencies
under the 1953 act are on two levels. The first level is the Price
Directorate, which has a central office in Oslo and local offices
throughout Norway. The majority of cases and registration are
handled at this level. The major decision-making body is the Price
Council made up of five members, the present chairman being a
member of the Supreme Court of Norway. Above the Council is
the Minister of Finance." Of special interest is the way in which
policy guidance is developed for the various organs administering
the law. The King (actually the Cabinet) annually gives to the Par-
liament a statement of policy to guide the administration for the
coming year. This is debated in the Parliament and may actually
be changed if the Parliament has very strong views on the matters
involved." On this basis, it may be seen that administrative decisions
and policy may lack certainty if new conditions warrant changes
in policy.
The act contains certain basic requirements and prohibitions. Arti-
35 Law of June 26, 1953, art. 2.38 Law of June 26, 1953, arts. 32-33, 35.
37 Law of June 26, 1953, arts. 32, 34-35.
3 Law of June 26, 1953, arts 34, 44; see also Thagaard, op. cit. supra note 14, at 16-19.
39 Law of June 26, 1953, arts. 3-9.
4 Law of June 26, 1953, art. 14.
19 58 ]
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cle 18 prohibits improper prices and improper or socially detrimental
business practices. Article 20 requires that prices be clearly marked
on tags or the like and that statements, invoices, or receipts be is-
sued for each transaction. Article 21 prohibits the carrying on of
unnecessary and cost-enhancing middleman activities. Article 22
should be of interest to students of the Federal Communications
Commission. It forbids, without consent of the Price Directorate,
the requesting or receiving of compensation for transfer of a busi-
ness license.
The 1953 act also vests power to control prices, dividends, and
profits in the administrative agencies.41 At present, profits and divi-
dends of approximately ten per cent of the enterprises are in fact
controlled. Apparently, such control has been considered necessary
to ensure effective operation of the entire regulatory structure. Pro-
fit and price structures are reported, and the administrative agen-
cies may change them retroactively if it is felt that such prices and
profits represent an undue utilization of the power derived from
the restrictive practices."
In 1956, temporary legislation was enacted to prohibit changes
in profit rates and prices by parties to restrictive arrangements with-
out prior approval of the Price Directorate." Dominant enterprises
were left subject to the previous controls. This may be considered
some evidence of the degree to which it has been necessary to balance
the power of restrictive practices by greater amounts of govern-
mental intervention.
Among the regular powers of the King, through the Price Coun-
cil, is the power to review the private enforcement activities of the
trade associations. Thus, boycotts, limitations on freedom of entry,
fines, refusal to deal, and similar activities are subject to review
and may be altered or enjoined. This power extends to the breaking
up of associations and arrangements.4 A further limitation on re-
strictive arrangements is the requirement that a participant in a
restrictive agreement or arrangement must so indicate when he tend-
ers a bid to someone inviting such tenders." The courts may re-
view the constitutionality of the decisions made, but there seems
4"Law of June 26, 1953, arts. 24-31. Note that article 28 gives the Storting (Parlia-
ment) the right to set dividend rates annually.
41 See Thagaard, op. cit. supra note 14, at 4.
"'Law of June 26, 1953, arts. 24.31.
44 See note 30 supra.
" Law of June 26, 1953, arts. 23, 40-42.
"Law of June 26, 1953, art. 39.
[Vol. 12
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little likelihood that they will be declared unconstitutional." Viola-
tions of law and decisions of the administrative bodies are subject
to criminal penalties that may be as high as imprisonment for three
years and fines.' s Unlawful prices and profits are subject to for-
feiture.""
It would seem that such broad controls would in themselves be
sufficient. However, beginning May 1, 1958, another mode of con-
trol was instituted. On the basis of Price Directorate studies of
the spread of resale price maintenance, and a determination that the
effect of such practices is harmful, a Royal Decree having force of
law was issued on October 18, 1957. Under this decree an individual
supplier may not, beginning May 1, 1958, fix resale prices or mark-
ups without prior approval of the Price Directorate. Dealers, how-
ever, may be advised of suggested prices as long as it is made clear
that they are free to price as they wish. Any coercive activity, no
matter how subtle, may be prohibited by the Price Directorate if
it is found that the practices hamper effective price competition.
Any coercion as to price is thus automatically a violation of law.
The activity under the ban may be either by the supplier or a trade
association or a third party. Collective activities by suppliers con-
cerning price suggestions are subject to more rigorous standards than
individual supplier activity. Exemptions from the resale price-main-
tenance ban rest on ability to show that the requested price fixing
aids rational productivity or otherwise benefits the public. It should
be recognized that horizontal price fixing is not within the purview
of the ban, even at the retail level. Horizontal agreements are, how-
ever, under study with a view to possible future legislation."'
Norway justifies its network of control legislation on the theory
that the economy of a small country dependent on imports cannot
operate without some forms of restrictions, and conversely, that re-
strictions may get out of hand if not controlled. The Norwegian
experience may well be indicative of future developments in similar
systems of control now in force in the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom, Germany, Demark, Sweden, Austria, and Japan. It is
highly significant that each attempt to enact a comprehensive con-
trol system is in a short time demonstrated to be inadequate, and
47 See Norwegian Whalers' Ass'n v. Norway, Norsk Rettstidende 1089 et seq. (1952);
for a discussion concerning constitutionality, see Report of the Ministry of Finance, The
Price Act, Enclosure No. I to Oslo, Dispatch No. 786, June 3, 1954, pp. 102-16.
4sLaw of June 26, 1953, arts. 52-59.
49Law of June 26, 1953, arts. 56-57.
5 See Thagaard, op. cit. supra note 14, at 11-13.
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further controls are found necessary to keep the previously con-
sidered "good" restrictive practices in check.
An American doing business in any form, whether by license or
otherwise, in Norway and in the enumerated countries having some-
what similar legislation, will find that he must register and, in some
instances, obtain permission for the restrictive activities he contem-
plates. He must know that certain practices are no longer legal or
may not be treated as such within the discretion of the administra-
tive agencies. He must recognize that administrative policy is subject
to annual change. The simplest way to do business in the registration
countries would be to assume that the Sherman and Clayton Acts
are in force and that resale price maintenance is probably illegal
and in some instances prohibited. Although it would be vigorously
denied that anything like our antitrust legislation is in force, the
practical effect is the same. Naturally, there are exceptions as is
seen upon examination of the differences between Norwegian and
similar legislation, but in the long run, counsel should advise his
client that the better practice is: No anti-competitive arrangements
are permitted unless some overriding factor makes consideration
of such practices apparently necessary.
B. Ireland
Ireland enacted its legislation in 1953. Law No. 14, the short
title of which is the Restrictive Trade Practices Act, became law
on May 7, 1953, under the title, "An Act Concerning Restrictive
Trade Practices in Regard to the Supply and Distribution of
Goods."'"
As the long title and the legislative debates indicate, the act is a
response to public concern over restrictive practices in the supply
and distribution of goods which seem to be inconsistent with the
general public welfare. The volume of complaints to the Department
of Industry and Commerce had reached proportions which could
not be ignored. Credit is also given by the Irish to the American ex-
perience and the educational process, which was discussed earlier
in this Article.'
The act is not concerned with monopoly or size of an enterprise.
The administrative organ, the Fair Trade Commission, consisting of
a chairman and between two and four other full-time members,3
3' Restrictive Trade Practices Act, Stationery Office (Dublin) (1953). This statute will
hereinafter be referred to by part, section, or schedule number.
" See unpublished manuscript by John J. Walsh, member of Fair Trade Commission,
International Conference on Restrictive Business Practices, Chicago, Jan. 16, 1958, pp. 1-2.
" Part I, § 2, first schedule, § 1.
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is given two tasks. The Commission is to prepare and publish Fair
Trading Rules for industry, similar to the activity conducted by the
Federal Trade Commission. The conducting of public enquiries is
the heading for its wide jurisdiction and powers.
The Fair Trading Rules may begin either by request of a trade
association or upon the Commission's own initiative. Notice and
hearings are required and the rules may cover not only the condi-
tions of supply and distribution of goods, but also services which
may affect the supply and distribution of the goods in question. The
rules must be reviewed and nonobservance is reported by the Com-
mission to the Minister. At this stage nonobservance does not mean
a penalty.
Enquiries are the major function of the Commission and may be
initiated by it, with or without an outside complaint, or may be
ordered by the Minister for Industry and Commerce. If a complaint
to the Commission does not result in an enquiry, the complainant
must be furnished with a statement setting forth the basis for such
a decision. The subject matter of the enquiries is limited to the sup-
ply and distribution of goods and relevant services. Unless there is
likelihood of disclosure of confidential information, the proceedings
are to be entirely in public and a matter of public record.
It might be well to note that one new feature of much, but not
all, of the new restrictive practices legislation of all types is the
element of public disclosure. Most proceedings and registers are open
to the public. This is indeed a new departure. The prevailing climate
in much of Europe has heretofore been toward strict business se-
crecy buttressed by laws against economic espionage. Apparently,
there is a realization that public support of governmental efforts will
not only strengthen the position of the administrators, but also pro-
vide a basis for obtaining needed additional information.
Upon the conclusion of the enquiry, the Commission is required
to report in full to the Minister on the conditions in the trade. This
requirement also applies to reports dealing with nonobservance of
trade-practice rules. The report of the enquiry must disclose whether,
and if so, how the conditions that prevail prevent or restrict com-
petition, restrain trade, or involve resale price maintenance. Finally,
the Commission must give its opinion on the relationship between
the interference with competition and the public interest and the
reasons for such conclusions. If the Commission believes that a min-
isterial order is desirable, a draft accompanies the report. The Min-
ister then places the report before both legislative bodies, thereby
giving the public notice of the results. The Minister is free to accept
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
or reject any or all recommendations in the report, promulgate an
order of his own drafting, or decide that there is no need for an
order.
If the Commission has recommended an order and if the Minister
has decided not to issue one, then within three months he must give
both legislative houses a statement of his reasons. A ministerial order
is without effect until confirmed by the legislature,54 which must
either accept or reject the order without amendment.5
The scope of the order is broad, and the Minister's powers are
without serious limitation. An order may prohibit specified arrange-
ments or agreements; prohibit the withholding of goods or services
from a specified class of persons; prohibit preferences in orders for
supplies or services; prohibit specified conditions governing supply
or distribution; and, finally, there are two general clauses which al-
low the Minister to take action necessary to ensure equitable treat-
ment of all persons to avoid unfair practices and to control restric-
tive practices."'
The Commission has a duty to review the operation of the legis-
lative orders and the general effect on the public interest of any
restrictive practices and may report to the Minister on its findings.
The legislative orders may be enforced by injunction on the mo-
tion of any person. Violation of an order is a criminal offense, and
individual officers are deemed to be guilty if a corporation is judged
guilty. Penalties may be as much as 5000 pounds plus a maximum
of 500 pounds per day for a continuing offense. Penal servitude may
be for as many as ten years. The various penalties may be joined to-
gether.'
Although the act contains no specific prohibition of practices,
eleven unfair trade practices are enumerated without being intended
to be exclusive or exhaustive. Each practice is qualified, so, in effect,
there is the operation of the rule of reason. Words such as "unrea-
sonably," "unjustly," and "likely" modify each denominated prac-
tice. The practices include: restraint of free and fair competition;
restraint of trade; elimination of a trade competitor; enhancement
of the price of goods or the promotion of the unfair advantage of
suppliers and distributors at the expense of the public; the securing
of a substantial or complete control of the supply or distribution of
goods or a class of goods contrary to the public interest; refusal to
deal and preferential treatment; geographical quotas or restrictions
"Part I, SS 4-10.
:5 Part I, S 9; see also Walsh, op. cit. supra note 52, at S.
" Part I, 5 9.
57 Part I, SS 10-14.
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on dealing in competitor's goods; and restriction on freedom of en-
try. The schedule of practices refers to acts by individuals, combina-
tions, mergers, cartels, trusts, and monopolies. This effectively gives
the Commission jurisdiction over the activities of individuals who
are not monopolists as well as all forms of combination and mono-
poly."
As is true in the other legislative systems, the Commission has
subpoena power over persons and documents and the right to ex-
amine under oath." These powers are to be found in all of the sys-
tems of legislation enumerated thus far. The Irish Commission must
make an annual report to the Minister, which report is made public
by its presentation to both houses of the legislature."° This insistence
on publicity is calculated and clearly intended. The Irish legislation
in some respects is duplicated by that of the Union of South Africa
and New Zealand, and some major features are reflected in the
German, Swedish, Japanese, and Canadian legislation.
The Irish legislation is very broad in its effect though it deals
with the distribution and supply of goods and related services. It
specifically does not mention production for several reasons. The
country is not highly industrialized; moreover, Ireland is seeking
to encourage foreign industrialization. Practically, this apparent lack
of control over production is not a major loss in controlling restric-
tive practices. Restrictions in production which cannot be related to
restrictions in distribution are normally meaningless. Thus, subject
to the actual policy of administration, the Irish legislation could be
most effective. Some evaluation of its effectiveness will be possible
when enforcement results are subsequently discussed.
An earlier Irish enactment is of particular interest in this day
of widespread and growing patent-licensing arrangements. Any per-
son may apply to the Controller of Patents for relief against the
abuse of the patent monopoly. Abuse includes: nonuse of a patent
three years after the date of application unless it is found that in-
sufficient time has elapsed, considering the nature of the patent, to
make commercial use practical; nonuse on a commercial scale caused
by importation of the patented article by the patentee or his li-
censees or infringers against whom the patentee has not acted; lim-
ited production unable to meet demand, considering the demand
that might exist if prices were lowered; unreasonably high prices
for a patented article when compared with prices in other countries;
"Second schedule.
"First schedule, SS 6, 8.
"First schedule, 5 11.
195 8]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
and unreasonable licensing restrictions. There arc other related forms
of abuse prohibited as well. Upon a determination by the Controller
of an abuse, he has broad powers to set the terms of compulsory
licensing, and he may even revoke the patent.
Other provisions of the legislation relate to providing a fair roy-
alty to patentees under the penalty provisions and place limitations
on general licensing, assignment, grant, or leasing arrangements.
These latter include a ban on tying clauses and a ban on restricting
the licensee, assignee, lessee, or purchaser from using someone else's
patented article or process or an article or process in the public do-
main. Some exceptions from this prohibition are provided.61 This
legislation, when'read in conjunction with the newer legislation on
restrictive practices, discloses a far-reaching intention by the Irish
to strike directly at many practices which are now illegal by judicial
interpretation of our own antitrust laws. Moreover, practices which
are legal in this country, such as nonuse, are prohibited. The patent
legislation speaks eloquently for itself, and to some degree similar
legislation is to be found in almost every country of the free world. 2
Thus, patent nonuse and misuse problems which have troubled our
courts have been made the subject of legislation which has a direct
bearing on foreign registration of American patents and the various
forms of licensing, assignment, and other arrangements dealing with
the transfer of certain rights of patentees.
C. France
France, a keystone of the new Common Market and a focal point
for American investment, has built its control of restrictive business
practices around a prohibition of resale price maintenance. Of course,
other countries have banned this form of price fixing, but France
is unique in the form and emphasis involved in its experiment with
this type of control.
The decree of August 9, 1953,3 which is the effective current law,
is a Cabinet decree with force of legislation, resulting from a legis-
lative delegation of plenary powers to the Cabinet after the failure
of the two parliamentary bodies to agree on a bill after months of
61 An Act to Make Provision for the Granting of Patents for Inventions, the Registra-
tion of Designs and Trade Marks, and the Definition and Protection of Copyright in
Saorstat Eireann, The Public General Acts Passed by the Oireachtas of Saorstat Eirann,
May 20, 1927, Stationery Office (Dublin) (1928), see especially § 43.
6"For a compendium of similar legislation, see Restrictive Business Practices, U.N.
EcoSoc Council Off. Rec. 16th Sess., Supp. No. 1IB (E/2379/add. 2) (1953); id., 19th
Sess., Supp. No. 3 (E/2671) (1954).
63 Decree $3.704, Aug. 9, 1953, Journal Officiel, Aug. 10, 1953.
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debate." In view of the antecedent ordinances which the decree of
August 9, 1953, amends, it is logical that resale price maintenance
and related practices are the major concerns of the legislative scheme.
On June 30, 1945, two ordinances by the Ministry of National
Economy were promulgated. The first dealt with price"5 and the
second with penalties for violations of economic legislation."6 The
first ordinance in article 37, as amended, created the following cate-
gories of illicit price practices: (1) refusal to sell or to supply serv-
ices in response to a normal demand; (2) price discrimination not
justified by cost factors; (3) limiting sales or services to special
times when, in fact, the enterprise was open to sell other products
or provide other services; (4) tying clauses involving either goods
or services and the imposition of a minimum quantity restriction;
(5) hoarding; and (6) imposition of minimum prices for goods
or services without permission of the interested ministry, with brand
name goods being subject to special regulation."
The second ordinance provides the basis for application of the
criminal court sanctions to violations of the first ordinance and the
1953 decree."
The decree of August 9, 1953, bears the title, "Decree 53.704,
Relative to the Maintenance or Reestablishment of Free Industrial
and Commercial Competition." It is accompanied by an exposition
of objectives in which the following purposes are enumerated:
(1) termination of practices which, by restraining proper commer-
cial competition, prevent any reduction in price; and (2) establish-
ment of the principle of prohibiting all practices which conflict
with the full exercise of competition by preventing the reduction
of resale or other selling prices.
The decree proceeds to implement the objectives by prohibiting
in article 59 his, subject to qualifications by article 59 ter, all forms
of concerted action, formal or informal ententes (cartels), or agree-
ments having as their object or capable of interfering with com-
petition by serving as an obstacle to reduction of retail or other sales
"4Loi 53.611, July 11, 1953. see Circulaire No. 65, Secretariat d'Etat aux Affaires
Economiques (Paris), March 31, 1954, p. 1.
65Ordonnance du Ministere de l'Economie Nationale, 45.1483, June 30, 1945, Journal
Officiel, July 8, 1945.
6 Id. at 45.1484.
"'Amendments are found in Loi 46.1024, May 14, 1946; Loi, April 4, 1947; Loi
52-835, July 18, 1952, Journal Officiel, July 19, 1952.
66Ordonnance du Ministere de l'Economie Nationale, Title V, June 30, 1945, Journal
Officiel, July 8, 1945. The maximum possible term of imprisonment is five years. The
maximum fine, adjusted according to the laws of May 24, 1946, September 25, 1948, and
April 14, 1952, is 200 million francs, which is approximately $500.000.
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prices or resulting in artificial and discriminatory price increases not
justified by costs.
Article 59 ter removes from the purview of the previous section
combinations, etc., created by legislative or administrative action.
Further possible exemption is available to those able to prove that
the arrangement is capable of improving or extending the market
or that the arrangement will ensure economic progress through ra-
tionalization and specialization. The burden of proof is the same
whether brand name goods are involved or not.
Article 2 of the decree amends article 37 of the first of the June
1945, ordinances by strengthening the language prohibiting any
businessman, industrialist, or artisan from refusing to sell or pro-
vide services in response to a bona fide demand that is not abnor-
mal.' A further addition to article 37 is its application to any per-
son responsible for concerted action to engage in or encouraging
others to engage in those practices prohibited by article 59 bis. Thus,
the scope of the legislation, as far as those subject to its jurisdiction,
is rendered comprehensive.
Article 37 is further strengthened by clearly prohibiting any
form of minimum price fixing for goods and services, whether ac-
complished by markups, suggested prices, or any type of agreement.
No longer are brand name goods in a special category.
The legal implementation is in several forms. Parties may plead
the decree as a defense in an action to enforce a prohibited practice
heretofore the subject of an agreement or arrangement. To some ex-
tent third parties may also avail themselves of the plea. Moreover,
under the provisions of article 1382 of the Civil Code,"' private
litigation will lie for an injury arising from an illegal restrictive
business practice. This is the basis for the private litigation that will
be discussed later. Further, the courts may order criminal penalties
as well as damages to reimburse the party injured by the practices.
The decree does not mention monopolies as such, but the ways a
monopoly could come within the purview of the law are set forth
subsequently.
In order to clarify the meaning of the three major prohibited
practices and other matters, the Ministry of Economic Affairs is-
" The decree has removed the 1945 requirement that the trader must have retained the
goods he has refused to sell as a prerequisite to liability. Prospective purchasers must now
be bona fide, a requirement that did not previously exist. The prohibitions against time
limitations on sales and services, tying clauses and minimum quantity requirements, and
hoarding in the first ordinance of June 30, 1945, are continued in effect by the August 9,
1953, decree.
70Code Civil, Petits Codes Dalloz (Paris) (1955). [This is also found in the current
edition of Codes et Lois, Juris-Classeurs (Paris)].
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sued an instruction commenting on the decree."' The observation is
made that discriminatory price increases and refusals to sell are stand-
ard devices to enforce minimum price fixing. Thus, in outlawing
minimum price fiixng, it was necessary that the related practices
also be banned. The ban does not extend to exclusive dealing ar-
rangements, which appear to be increasing in France at present and
which may well be the subject of new legislation very shortly.
The elements to be proved when alleging a refusal to sell are set
forth and include: (1) the refusing party carries on a trade, busi-
ness, or craft; (2) a statutory or administrative regulation pro-
hibiting the sale of the goods or the supplying of the services is ab-
sent; (3) the refusing party had the products requested and they
were for sale, or the products could have been obtained without
depriving those to whom earlier commitments for delivery had been
made; and (4) the request was both normal and bona fide.
The major defenses are related to the available supply of goods,
considering the ordinary needs of the purchaser or the normal out-
put of the producer. An exclusive agreement is a defense, but the
Ministry requires that such exclusive arrangements meet certain
minimum tests. It must be shown that the contract improves the
service to the consumer, does not raise prices or keep them at a high
level, or does not reduce sales volume below market demand. A
further requirement is that a bilateral, exclusive contract binds
just the two parties, with the entire output reserved for the pur-
chaser. In the case of multilateral, exclusive contracts, there must
be reciprocal obligations of a specified nature between the seller
and each purchaser. These would include the guarantee by the seller
to protect the purchaser's exclusive right in a given territory. The
purchaser must agree to and actually carry out such obligations as
the duty to repair, to keep a supply of spare parts, to refrain from
selling competing goods, or to share in the costs of advertising.
In no way are integrated concerns affected by such limitations.
However, if any producer sells to wholesalers, he must sell to any
member of the business community who wishes to purchase on
wholesale terms. Similarly, if producers normally sell to retailers,
then any member of the business community may demand the same
terms. The prohibition against discriminatory higher prices is deemed
to be for the protection of consumer cooperatives, discount houses,
and others who may not always meet with favor in the business
community."
71 Circulaire, Feb. IS, 1954. Gazette du Palais, 1954, L. 566.
" This summary is from the Circulaire, supra note 71.
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At the heart of the French system is the administrative agency
created by the 1953 decree. Article 59 quater creates a Technical
Commission for Ententes with a member of the Conseil d'Etat as
President. Five other members may be chosen from the Conseil
d'Etat, which is the highest administrative court, the Cour de Cassa-
tion, which is the supreme court, other judicial courts, or the Cour
des Comptes, which is similar to our General Accounting Office.
Four members are to come from professional organizations and two
more from the National Productivity Committee. 3 The Technical
Commission has the duty to examine violations of article 59 bis and
defenses under article 59 ter. Decisions and opinions are by majority
vote. The Commission has broad investigative powers based on the
first ordinance of June 30, 1945, and it is required to meet with
the interested parties and give them a hearing. A secretariat which
functions as the coordinator of investigations is provided. Provision
is made for the transmission of cases to the public prosecutor by
the Minister of Economic Affairs for prosecution under either article
419 of the Penal Code"' or the second ordinance of June 30, 1945.
By decree 54-97 of January 27, 1945," the government estab-
lished the administrative procedures for the Technical Commission.
Article 12 prohibits public hearings and public meetings of the
Commission, and this principle is amplified by article 19 which
makes the work of the Commission secret in its entirety. Article 20
provides for an annual report, but the report is to be made to the
Minister of Economic Affairs, and he has not chosen to transmit
much of that information to the public.
Of major importance is article 17 which provides that the Min-
ister, before arriving at a decision based on the recommendations
of the Commission, which decision could lead to prosecution, may
invite the interested parties to take the necessary measures to main-
tain or re-establish free industrial and commercial competition. This
effectively gives the Minister the power to negotiate a secret consent
decree.
In order to clarify the meaning of these regulations and the scope
of the activity of the Technical Commission under the decree of
August 9, 1953, the Ministry issued its Circulaire No. 65 on March
" This is recognition of the effect of the Productivity Program of the Marshall Plan.
The word "Productivite" came into the French language as a result of that program.
"'Penal Code of 1810, as amended, Code Penal, Petits Codes Dalloz (Paris) (1955).
[This may also be found in the current edition of Codes et Lois, Juris-Classeurs (Paris)].
See also the related articles 412, 420, and 421.
" See note 64 supra, Annexe 4, Circulaire No. 65, pp. 23-25.
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31, 1954. It has the virtue of telling the public with some precision
how broadly the basic law is interpreted.
It is made clear that not all cartels or combinations are forbidden.
As long as a cartel does not have a "fatal" effect on prices, it is
legal. On the other hand, the legislation is interpreted as prohibiting
any form of combination which eliminates competition without
meeting the requirements for exemption set forth in the decree.
Thus, article 59 bis of the decree is interpreted as applying to all
forms of arrangements or concerted actions, express or tacit, no
matter what form they may take, if they could obstruct the full
play of competition. Neither the economics or legal form of the
cartel nor other arrangement will in itself prevent the application
of the decree.
No matter what legal entity or form the arrangement takes, it
is not sufficient to insulate the responsible individual persons from
personal liability or punishment in the event of a violation of the
law. This view is based on the application of the second ordinance
of June 30, 1945, particularly article 56. Under this article it is
not necessary to prove an intent to do the wrong, though such proof
is a prerequisite to the application of article 419 of the Penal Code.
The decree is considered to be territorial, and jurisdiction is not
based on nationality or domicile. Thus, foreign corporations par-
ticipating in a French restrictive arrangement are liable, but export
cartels or similar arrangements which have no domestic application
are outside of the prohibition."8
Three elements must exist to bring a cartel or combination with-
in the area of violation. There must be observable practices which
result in an entente." These practices must have an effect on com-
petition that is at least susceptible of affecting price." Finally, the
practices must not be entitled to an exception under article 59 ter
of the decree of August 9, 1953. 7
In determining the existence of an entente, there is excluded
what is considered a "bathtub conspiracy," an intra-enterprise con-
" Circulaire No. 65, pp. 4-6.
"'The word "entente" literally means an agreement between producers, distributors, etc.
It has become the French equivalent of "cartel," but within the context of the legislative
scheme, it is used to cover all types of agreements, arrangements, and understandings in-
volving two or more participants.
'"Cf. the decision in United States v. Socony Vacuum Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940),
which brought under the ban of § I of the Sherman Act practices indirectly affecting price.
"'Circulaire No. 65, p. 8. The 59 ter exemptions rest on legislative or administrative
acts or a showing that markets are improved or extended or that economic progress is en-
hanced through rationalization and specialization.
19 58 ]
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spiracy." Moreover, permitted ancillary restrictions involving patents
are not within the scope of the legislation." Although, strictly,
monopolies 'are outside the scope of the legislation, the Instruction
warns that the Commission must watch for monopolies built upon
agreements involving the monopoly and former or potential competi-
tors who have given up the market in question in return for some
benefit, such as a monopoly in another field. Activities tending to cre-
ate a monopoly through merger, exchanges of stock, purchase, use of
a common sales agency, and similar activities leading to market domi-
nation are considered to be within the jurisdiction of the Commission
and under the legislation."'
Among the forms of joint activity which would be considered
legal absent other arrangements are those leading to possible lowering
of prices through joint product, market research, group advertising,
or like collective activities. However, such joint practices as limita-
tion of production or sales volume, penalization for exceeding sales
quotas, division of sources of supplies of raw materials, sharing of
orders, or division of markets on a geographical or professional basis
are all deemed to affect price adversely."
As for the exceptions provided by article 59 ter, technical progress
is only one factor of the concept of "economic progress" which the
entente must prove it is developing. In order to justify an exemption
it must be shown that the entente has caused either a lowering of
price or an increase in quality without raising price. The develop-
ment of an export market may justify a domestic entente as long
as it does not cause an increase in domestic prices. The conclusion is
reached that an exemption must be based on proof of a salutary
effect on prices." The interpretation of the exemption or derogation
features of the legislative scheme is in fact one that is most suscep-
tible to lobbying and similar pressures."
"0 Ibid. Here the emphasis is placed on the economic unity of the enterprise. It is not
clear what interpretation will be placed on an agreement between a parent and a subsidiary
when each of them enjoys the status of a separate legal entity.
0' Ibid. The French patent law is not unlike the Irish legislation previously discussed.
The laws governing patents may be found in Code de Commerce, Petits Codes Dalloz
(Paris) (1955). In general, it may be said that licensing or patent assignments which are
designed to prevent competitors from exploiting the invention are legal. Thus, an exclusive
license or an agreement not to compete by an assignor of a patent is not barred.
81 Id. at 8-9.
" Id. at 9-10. This administrative interpretation resembles a large body of American
case law tediously developed over many years of litigation. Cf. discussion in Report of the
Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws 5-30 (Washington)
(19; 5).
" Id. at 10-11.
" Although no official exemption has been published for pharmaceuticals, both pre-
scription and nonprescription, and other drugstore items, fixed prices continue and are
not as yet prosecuted or investigated. A comparison of the ability of the French drug in-
[Vol. 12
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Two types of investigations are called for in the Circulaire. The
preliminary investigaton is a process of fact finding which goes no
further than providing background information for the files of the
Secretariat."
The major investigation is the one which puts the entente to the
various tests and which may lead to the secret consent decree or a
prosecution. The authors of the Circulaire have doubts about the
possibility of being able to find written evidence of agreements that
remain in force after the decree. However, the law is interpreted
as permitting proof by circumstantial evidence and presumptions.
It is assumed that some helpful information can come from dissi-
dents outside the entente and from those who purchase goods from
or utilize services of the entente. Among the factors given weight
in determining the existence of a clandestine entente is price uni-
formity in light of different rates of profit. Moreover, if offers to sup-
ply goods or services from several enterprises reach a total approxi-
mately equal to the needs of the potential purchaser, it is deemed
evidence of a market-sharing agreement." This use of circumstan-
tial evidence should not be unfamiliar to students of American
antitrust law."'
Once the existence of the entente is established, the next step in
the investigation is proof of the effect on price. The investigators
have the burden of proving that in fact the entente has had a deleter-
ious effect on price. This proof can be effected by various forms of
price comparison. If part of an industry is cartellized and part is free,
a comparison of prices related to profit rates can be used to show the
adverse effects of the arrangement. Partially cartellized industries are,
however, atypical. It is also possible to make a price comparison con-
sidering the profit rates before and after cartellization of an industry.
Since this form of comparison is difficult, a study of the relationship
between price and profits of efficient and inefficient members of the
cartel will suffice. The existence of abnormal profit for the more ef-
ficient members is all that need be demonstrated. A study of unused
capacity in the efficient enterprises to show how much more could be
produced under competitive conditions is also permissible. More-
over, a comparison between prices in France and other countries for
dustry to avoid investigation, and the lobbying activity of The National Association of
Retail Druggists and related organizations, on behalf of resale price maintenance would
seem appropriate.
88Circulaire No. 65, pp. 11-12.
t 
Id. at 13.
88 Cf. Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws 36-42 (1955), discussing conscious parallelism and proof of conspiracy under S 1 of
the Sherman Act, 26 Star. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §5 1-7 (1952).
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similar goods and services, allowing for basic differences in the respec-
tive economies, is considered a particularly valuable method of proof.
The Circulaire considers proof of exemption by legislative or ad-
ministrative act a simple matter of showing the official records. As to
the exemption based on economic progress, the Commission is given
the broad authority to establish its own standards."
The balance of the Circulaire is concerned mainly with the internal
organization of the Technical Commission and the Secretariat.
Finally, there is an explanation of the extent of the power of the
Minister in negotiating the secret consent decrees. There is general
power to meet the particular facts of a case and conditions of an in-
dustry. Examples, by no means exclusive, of conditions that might
be imposed on an entente are: (1) change of the statutes of the
entente; (2) change of commercial policies; (3) compulsory price
reductions; and (4) required furnishing of cost justifications and
periodic reports permitting control of prices and profit margins. De-
partmental heads of the bureaus of the ministries involved are to be
notified of the terms of the instructions so that they can oversee the
execution of the orders."0 However, no provision is made for public
information to buttress enforcement or for notification to those who
purchase goods or utilize services of the ententes. Thus, a baker
might never learn that he is free to buy yeast from more than one
manufacturer at a competitive price. 1
D. The European Coal and Steel Community
M. Jean Monnet, the first President of the High Authority and
major architect of the treaty which came into force on July 25,
1952, has described articles 65 and 66" as "Europe's first major an-
titrust law." 9 The extent to which hope and reality are related may
well provide a guide to the results that will be obtained from articles
SgCirculaire No. 65, pp. 14-15.
90 Id. at 19-20.
" Rapport Annuel de la Commission Technique des Ententes au Ministre Charge des
Affaires Economiques (Paris), Dec. 31, 1955, pp. 14-17. This, the Commission's first annual
report to the Minister, is still classified as "confidentiel." It is an excellent report reflecting
a high degree of professional competency, dealing in this instance with the yeast cartel
which the Commission recommended be broken, September 24, 1955. The Report indicates
that the Minister has accepted this recommendation. Involved was a classic cartel, created
by the Vichy government with production quotas, penalties for overproduction, and in-
demnities for underproduction. Identical prices and conditions of sale and geographic division
of markets gave the bakers no choice. Moreover, the cartel paid the owners of closed enter-
prises normal rates of profits for not producing.
"The text consulted was the unofficial English language version published by the High
Authority and printed in Great Britain by the Fanfare Press, Ltd., London.
"3 High Authority Information Documents, No. 2, The High Authority and The Trusts
(Luxembourg), Sept. 1, 1955, p. 2.
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85-90 of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Commun-
ity, the Common Market.4
Article 65 of the Coal and Steel Treaty starts by a rule of pro-
hibition against concerted practices tending directly or indirectly
to restrict competition. It then gives examples including price fixing,
limitation on production, and allocation of markets, customers, or
sources of supply. This short statement is then followed by a very
long one giving the conditions under which the High Authority may
authorize periods of time agreements to specialize in production or
to engage in joint buying and selling activities. These conditions
include a showing that the activities will improve the economy, are
essential to achieve such results, and will not give power to deter-
mine prices or the production of the commodity in the market.
The loophole is further extended by giving the High Authority the
right to exempt "analogous agreements," which term is not strictly
defined. The remainder of article 65 is devoted to procedural mat-
ters such as the right of the High Authority to obtain information
and the right to decide cases and assess penalties, subject to appeal
to the court.
Article 66 deals with concentration of power and starts with the
presumption that concentration is proper unless proved otherwise.
Transactions involving concentration must be authorized by the
High Authority, and authorization is to be granted unless it is found
that the concentration will give power to control production, deter-
mine prices, or restrict competition in a substantial part of the mar-
ket for the products involved. The High Authority must determine
what is meant by control of an enterprise as a prerequisite to ap-
plying the concept of concentration. It is assumed that control may
exist in other forms than by merger, acquisition of shares, contracts,
and similar devices. Further, the High Authority may exempt cer-
tain transactions by reason of size from the requirement of prior
authorization. Provision is made for breaking up concentrations, in-
voking penalties, and related matters.
No provision governing export cartels as such is spelled out. Some
persons argue that the language of article 65 forbidding concerted
practices restricting or distorting competition within the Coal and
Steel Market could be applied to export cartels. The theory is that
export cartels cannot exist without affecting the Common Market
in some way. Certainly, pricing practices of the export cartel and
the resultant demand or lack of demand for products outside of the
" The text used is the mimeographed provisional translation issued by the Community's
Information Service (Washington), May 6, 1957.
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Common Market are reflected in the availability, price, and produc-
tion of goods for use in the Common Market. Export prices higher
than community prices in a seller's market divert production from
the community and create a scarcity."'
The High Authority has issued a series of decisions designed to
implement articles 65 and 66. Decision 37/53" required existing
cartels to register. Subsequently, sixty-three cartels were registered."
In order to implement article 66, three regulations were promul-
gated in 1954."8 The first regulation defines control of an enterprise.
Ownership of assets, influence on management, control over supplies
of materials, and similar forms may be control, but they are signi-
ficant only if the person or persons concerned are able to determine
the operation of an enterprise as to production, prices, investments,
supplies, sales, and allocation of profits. Lenders of capital such as
banks and banking houses are treated liberally, and therefore are
not regulated under the control concept as long as they do not ex-
ercise voting rights.
The second regulation sets up the criteria for exemption from
prior authorization for small concentrations. Exemption is granted
where the concentration will not result in a volume of production
sufficient to constitute an efficient operating unit. Vertical con-
centration is also permissible. The limit for crude steel production
is set at 1.2 million metric tons. Similar limits are set for other pro-
ducts.
The third regulation defines the obligation of those not subject
to the jurisdiction of the High Authority to submit information.
There is a distinction between a request and a compulsory obligation.
Obligation exists when an interest holds more than ten per cent
of the capital of an enterprise in the Community, representing a
total dollar value exceeding $100,000. Banks acquiring assets on be-
half of clients or as trustees are exempt. This is an application of the
business secrecy privilege concept. The type of information to be
given relates to the acquisition and exercise of the ownership in-
volved.
"Troisieme Reunion Joints des Membres de l'Assemblee Consultative du Conseil de
l'Europe et des Membres de l'Assemblee Commune de la Communaute Europeene du Charbon
et de l'Acier (Strasbourg), Oct. 27, 1955, Expose du Rapporteur de la Commission des
Questions Economiques de l'Assemblee Consultative, pp. 34-35.
96 Decision 37/53, July 11, 1953, Official Gazette of the Community, No. 10, July 21,
1953.
"The High Authority, Report on the Situation of the Community, laid before the
Extraordinary Session of the Common Assembly (Luxembourg), Nov. 1954, p. 96.
"Decision 24/54, Decision 25/54, and Decision 26/S4, May 6, 1954, Official Gazette
of the Community, No. 9, May 11, 1954. Decision 25/54 was subsequently amended by
Decision 28/54, May 26, 1954, Official Gazette of the Community, No. II, May 31, 1954.
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Before evaluating the effectiveness and the implementation of
articles 65 and 66 of the Coal and Steel Treaty, as well as other re-
cent administrative and judicial decisions, a brief analysis will be
made of the European Economic Community Treaty Restrictive
Practices provisions. Because many American firms are already plan-
ning to gain the benefits of the eventual, large, integrated market,
these provisions and any conjectures concerning their impact are
particularly important. At the recent International Conference on
Restrictive Business Practices in Chicago during January 1958, Euro-
pean and American expert opinions which, under the rules of the
Conference must remain anonymous, seemed evenly divided on the
efficacy of articles 85-89. There was agreement that the major dan-
ger not covered by the articles is the danger of export cartels ex-
porting outside the Common Market, similar to the Brussels Entente
that now exists in the Coal and Steel Community."
Article 85 denominates certain activities as being incompatible
with the Common Market and therefore prohibited. The proscribed
activities include all agreements between firms, all decisions to merge,
and all concerted practices likely to affect trade between the mem-
ber states... and having as their object or result the prevention, re-
striction, or distortion of the free play of competition within the
Common Market. Nothing could appear clearer than this language
which is reinforced by reference to five categories of practices which
are particularly prohibited. These include: (1) direct or indirect
establishment of cost or sales prices; (2) limitation or control of
production, markets, and technical development; (3) market shar-
ing or sharing of sources of supply; (4) discrimination in price or
terms of sale; and (5) tying clauses. Such agreements or decisions
are null and void unless it can be shown that the agreements or con-
certed practices or decisions will improve production and distribu-
tion of goods and promote economic or technical progress while en-
suring a fair sharing of the benefits of such improvements or pro-
gress with consumers. However, no nonessential restrictions may be
imposed, nor may the arrangement lead to the elimination of com-
petition as to a substantial portion of the goods in question.
' The High Authority does not deem that the Brussels Entente (export cartel) is
serious, High Authority Information Documents, No. 2, The High Authority and The
Trusts (Luxembourg), Sept. 1, 1955, p. 7. However, contrary views are discussed in the
European Coal and Steel Community (Part I), Studies in Business and Economics, Vol. 9,
No. 3 (Univ. of Md.), Dec. 1955, pp. 17-19.
... The phrase, "trade between the Member States," is the key to some of the difficulties
in making the article a reality. Jurisdiction is based on inter-member state commerce and
is thereby a new concept lacking a body of law. In view of the existence of major cartels




Article 86 is directed against the action of one or more dominant
firms which could take unfair advantage of their position within the
Common Market " ' or a substantial portion of it. Four examples are
given of the types of unfair practices prohibited. They are identical
in all but two respects with the list under article 85. Market sharing
and sharing of sources of supply are omitted. With reference to
limitation on production, markets, or technical development, there
is added the further qualification that such actions be to the pre-
judice of consumers.
Thus far, nothing could be clearer than the fact that restraints
of trade and market domination practices are prohibited, save for
the cases falling under the exception in article 85. No exceptions
are allowed to the prohibited actions by a dominant or combination
of dominant firms. The area to which the prohibitions apply, how-
ever, is not so clear.
Article 87 requires that the two executive organs of the Common
Market, the Commission and Council, in consultation with the Le-
gislative Assembly issue appropriate regulations within the first three
years of the life of the treaty in accordance with alternative voting
procedures. The regulations are to ensure enforcement by the in-
stitution of fines or means of compulsion and to implement the ex-
emptions in article 85. A possible sign of weakness in articles 85 and
86 is the requirement in article 87 that the regulations define the
scope of those articles with respect to various sectors of the econo-
my.' O2 The other regulations are to deal with the jurisdictional re-
lationships between the executive and the court and, the relationship
between national laws and the articles of the treaty. Until the regu-
lations are issued, each member state is, according to article 88, to
pass on the practices in its own jurisdiction.' 3 Article 89 empowers
the Commission to undertake an immediate investigation of infringe-
ments of the principles of articles 8 5 and 86 with or without the col-
laboration of member states. The Commission is also to supervise
the application of the principles of articles 85 and 86 even before
the regulations are promulgated. This includes the power to decide
if an infringement of a principle exists and the power to authorize
the appropriate member states to act.
'0' Article 96 also contains the key phrase discussed in note 100 supra.
'0' The implication is that certain sectors of the economy may or may not be able
to survive competition as well as others.
103This may be meaningless because no member state controls export cartels which
would appear to be the only ones affected by the Treaty, insofar as the cartels operate
from one member state to another.
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The remaining related articles deal with state monopolies, dump-
ing practices, and the like.
The problem of harmonizing the treaty provisions with the legal
systems governing restrictive practices in the member countries is
a major one. Article 100 of the treaty provides for directives on
harmonization of laws. However, this does not answer the problems
of whether the Common Market law on restrictive practices will be
federal in nature and the laws of the member states will continue
as State law. There is every likelihood that a dual legal system will
exist and control of restrictive business practices that are purely
domestic within a member state will not fall under the ban of the
treaty. Assuming that this problem is somehow resolved, there is
the further practical question of whether a stronger federal law on
restrictive practices can coexist in the Common Market with the
weaker laws of the member states. Belgium and Luxembourg have
no legislation controlling restrictive practices, though Belgium is
considering such legislation."' Italy has a Mussolini law which it ig-
nores and hopes to replace soon."5 The Netherlands has a registration
law that includes the power to order compulsory cartellization.1 '
The new German law is a registration law, but it appears to be very
broad and entirely dependent on whims of administration as to the
degree of its suppression of restrictive practices." 7 The position of
France has been discussed. If the Common Market has a Free Trade
area added to it, then there will be such conflicts as the legalization of
nonsigners' clauses for resale price maintenance in the British legis-
lation... as against the French ban. Such a conflict already exists be-
tween the French and German legislation.' °9
The problems of the Common Market are practical rather than
legal. A Common Market must be able to develop in the face of
existing cartels of great strength such as exist in the Netherlands
104 Authority for this prediction is found in an unpublished manuscript by Dr. P. M.
Raskin, Director of Professional Organizations and Economic Disputes of the Belgian Min-
istry of Economic Affairs, International Conference on Restrictive Business Practices, Chi-
cago, Jan. 15, 1958, pp. 3-4.
'°'Codice Civile arts. 2595-2620 (Italy 1949).
... Discussion of the Economic Competition Act of 1956, unpublished manuscript by
Dr. P. Verloren van Themaat, Director of Oflice of Industrial Organization Problems,
Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs, International Conference on Restrictive Busi-
ness Practices, Chicago, Jan. 15, 1958, p. 12.
1"' For an English language version, see Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb, Dokumentation
V. No. 1, 1958. Sections 2-7 provide for wide discretion in the Cartel Authority. Section
8 gives the Federal Minister of Economics the power to authorize any sort of cartel if
necessary for the common good.
'08 Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, § 25.
'09 Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, § 16. Section 17 of the
act provides for cancellation of the previously registered automatic authorization if there
is misuse of the price-fixing right.
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and, despite the self-centered concentrations, such as exist in the
Italian, French, and German automobile industries. ' Then, if in-
deed a Common Market comes into being with no geographic allo-
cations to common sales agencies such as have been legalized in the
Coal and Steel Community,"' there may be a possibility for imple-
menting the language of articles 85 and 86.
V. THE ENFORCEMENT RECORD
A. The Coal and Steel Community
An apocryphal story is told by the Community's lawyers of the
very first day of the Community's existence when Jean Monnet,
the first President, called in his attorneys and said, "Which cartels
will we begin to break up this week?" If the story is not true, it
nevertheless represents the spirit of the High Authority. However,
it fails to reflect the very difficult problems with which the Com-
munity is and has been faced. Probably no other industry has been
as heavily dominated by national and international cartels as has
steel." Coal represents a long-established system of cartels, sales
agencies, and government agencies controlling either import or ex-
port, or both. ' It is against this background of national and inter-
10For a pessimistic discussion of the potential of articles 85 and 86, see Francois
Perroux, Les Formes de Ia Concurrence dans le Marche Commun, Revue d'Economie Poli-
tique, Jan.-Feb. 1958, Paris, p. 340 et seq. Compare the anxiety expressed by The In-
ternational Chamber of Commerce which has urged a delay in the implementation of
articles 85 and 86. The Chamber considers these articles to be "discriminatory" against
existing agreements. Apparently, the Chamber believes that article 88, binding Member
States to implement articles 85 and 86, will be invoked. One may ask why the Chamber
seems surprised by treaty provisions known for the past several years. See article entitled
"Six Nation Market Urged to Delay Anti-Trust Rulings," N.Y. Times, April 1, 1957.
. The High Authority has allowed exemptions from the operation of article 65 for
common sales agencies such as those of the Ruhr. There, three agencies, as a result of a
number of decisions and a judgment of the court, have been given sales zones. The court,
in Matter 2-56, between the Ruhr Common Sales Agency (Geitling) and the High
Authority, Journal Officiel, April 16, 1957, p. 166/57 et seq., found that the High Au-
thority was obligated to pass upon the sales agency under the provisions of article 65,
and that without authorization from the High Authority the agency would be in viola-
tion of the article. Moreover, the court found that the High Authority, by defining a
wholesaler as one who had purchased 12,500 tons of coal from one of the other agencies
and like amount from "Geitling," was creating a cartel. The definition was stricken. By
a series of subsequent High Authority decisions, the schemes of operation for the three
common sales agencies in the Ruhr were modified. These modifications include the allo-
cation of geographic sales areas. The decisions involved are: 10-57, 11-57, and 12-57,
April 1, 1957, Journal Officiel, April 16, 1957, pp. 159/57-163/57; 16-57, 17-57, and 18-57,
July 26, 1957, Journal Officiel, Aug. 10, 1957, pp. 319/57-352/57; and 24-57, and
26-57, Dec. 10, 1957, Journal Officiel, Dec. 27, 1957, pp. 629/57-635/57. Similar sales
zones and similar sales agencies have been authorized.
" For an exhaustive analysis, see Rieben, Des Ententes de Maitres de Forges, au Plan
Schuman 81-89, 103-45, 215-313, 475-82, 493, 528 (Lausanne) (1954).
"'Expose de M. Rene Mayer, President de la Haute Autorite sur l'Activite de la
Communaute, Assemblee Commune, Session Ordinaire, 1955-1956 (Strausbourg), May 8,
1956, Publication 1754/2/56/1, pp. 29-33.
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national cartels as well as relatively great concentrations that the
High Authority began its work." '
Because American interests in the Community's enterprises are
practically nonexistent, little more than a summary of some of the
highlights and attitudes will be attempted. They may serve as a guide
to possible future results in the Common Market.
Generally, it is believed that the anti-cartel policy is leading to
increased concentration in the Community. The facts on concentra-
tion are not easily obtained because of the policy of the High
Authority to keep secret its rulings under article 66 as a means of
preventing speculation in the stock market."' The Common Assem-
bly of the Community, much to the surprise of many who thought
it would be a political arena, has shown much interest in both the
problems of cartels and concentration to an extent that might even
annoy the High Authority.' In this connection, one of the Assem-
bly's committees has issued a report on concentration and has asked
that the High Authority keep it informed of developments."'
The Coal and Steel Community believes that concentration in the
Community can only be measured by a comparison with the United
States or the United Kingdom. On that basis, which assumes that
the purchasing power of the 160 million inhabitants of the Com-
munity may be equated to that of the population of the United
States, it is found that the largest steel enterprise in the Community
is smaller than each of the eight largest American enterprises, with
an annual production one tenth of that of the United States Steel
Corp. The comparisons omit the fact that total United States produc-
tion is almost three times greater than Community production.
As of a year ago, the High Authority had investigated 94 con-
centrations, 51 because of its study of market conditions and 43
on the basis of requests for authorization. Twenty authorizations
were granted, of which 16 were requested. Of the remainder, 3 were
permitted conditionally after the payment of fines, 8 antedated the
treaty, 2 needed no authorization, and 15 did not even involve arti-
114See Rieben, op. cit. supra note 112.
"' High Authority Information Documents, No. 2, The High Authority and'The
Trusts (Luxembourg), Sept. 1, 1955, pp. 5, 7.
16E.g., questions relating to cartels and concentration posed by M. Michel Debre,
member of the Common Assembly, and replies from the High Authority in which one
may detect a note of asperity. Official Gazette, May 11, 1955, pp. 179-81, Nov. 16, 1956,
p. 350, Dec. 27, 1956, pp. 401-02.
"
7 Assemblee Commune, Exercise 1956-1957, Session Ordinaire, Rapport, Fait au Nom
de la Commission du Marche Commun sur les Concentrations d'Enterprises dans la Com-
munaute, Document No. 26, May 1957, pp. 14-16. 19; Annexe I, p. 34; Annexe III,
p. 40; Annexe IV, p. 41.
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cle 66 of the treaty. The balance of 46 were still being studied. In
other words, no authorization has been withheld."'
In the area of cartels the picture is somewhat different. Of the 63
cartels that registered, 32 did not come under the provisions of arti-
cle 65 of the treaty, and 4 cartels liquidated voluntarily before a
decision was reached." '
In general, it can be said that the Community began by breaking
up some national scrap-buying cartels."' These would probably have
gone because of the scrap shortage problems and the need for equal
treatment and access to scrap in the Common Market. Subsequently,
the Community began to authorize specialization agreements and
joint sales agencies in the production of steel and joint sales agen-
cies for various types of fuel.'21 The great Ruhr coal sales agency was
divided into three units, and action was taken against other sales
and import agencies involving coal.'2' On the other hand, zone pric-
ing schemes and other arrangements involving price have been le-
galized." 3 By our standards this may not appear to be an earth-shak-
ing record. There is, however, another side to the picture which may
indicate that the Community has shown great strength in taking
anti-cartel action against governments and some of the major coal
cartels.
It is difficult to overestimate the magnitude of the problem with
which the Community is faced. Underlying the apparent "go slow"
policy is a real fear that was expressed in the summer of 1956 by
some of the officials of the High Authority. They said, "Suppose we
do break up the cartels. At present with a seller's market for steel
we would be under only a little criticism. However, there is a likeli-
hood that in the next several years things will change. When that
"1 Ibid.
n'High Authority Information Documents, No. 2, The High Authority and The
Trusts (Luxembourg), Sept. 1, 1955, p. 7. Report on the Situation of the Community
laid before the Extraordinary Session of the Common Assembly (Luxembourg), Nov.
1954, p. 96.
Id. at 7-8. The national importing cartels were succeeded by a single cartel under
an authorized exemption under article 65. In part, the United States' export restrictions
on scrap made this necessary. In 1955, the United States questioned the exclusive arrange-
ment between the cartel and a United States exporter. The High Authority ordered the
termination of this restrictive practice, while continuing to authorize the scrap import
cartel. See Dep't of State Press Release No. 381, June 21, 1957, pp. 5-7, 15-17.
"'E.g., Decisions 11/56, March 7, 1956, Official Gazette, March 29, 1956, p. 121;
see note I11 supra, Decisions 31/54, 32/54, 33/54, and 34/54, June 25, 1954, Journal
Officiel, July 6, 1954; Decisions 40/54 and 41/54, July 29, 1954, Journal Officiel, Aug. 1,
1954.
22 See note III supra; Quatrieme Rapport General sur I'Activite de la Communaute,
April 11, 1955-April 8, 1956 (Luxembourg), April 8, 1956, Document No. 1743/2-
/156/1, pp. 139-54.
123E.g., Decisions 16/156, 17/56, 18/56, 19/156, 20/56, and 21/56, March 25, 1956,
Official Gazette, March 29, 1956.
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happens our anti-cartel program will be blamed for the recession.
Possibly, we need a recession with cartels operating as an example,
and then we can proceed." The opportunity may be at hand.
B. The Netherlands
In 1927, it was still possible to say that no cartels existed in the
Netherlands."4 Netherlands' cartel legislation began in 1935,"2' and
the present form is embodied in the Economic Competition Act of
1956."' It is registration legislation which empowers the government
to make cartellization compulsory or to dissolve cartels. The number
of nationwide registered cartels increased from 450 in 1950 to 850
in 1956. These included 50 production cartels, 180 market quota
arrangements, more than 500 price agreements, 250 agreements deal-
ing with other conditions of sale, 100 exclusive-dealing agreements,
and 90 central purchasing or sales agencies. In addition, some 1,000
cartels of less than nationwide scope were registered. Since 1956,
there has been no increase in registration, which may well be due
to the new policies embodied in the current legislation which seem
stricter than before. However, the 1956 act is not yet operative be-
cause of the lack of supplementary legislation dealing with the right
to appeal to an independent court." ' For that reason the cases to be
examined, beginning in 1950, will be under the Cartel Decree of
November 5, 1941, as amended."' It would seem fair to assume that
when the new act comes into force, the treatment of restrictive busi-
ness practices will be even more strict than before.
Among the practices which have been prohibited are boycotts of
organizations such as co-operatives, but the cartel arrangements were
otherwise permitted to stand, thus requiring the co-operatives to
join if they wished to obtain the goods."' Boycott of department
stores has been similarly treated on the theory that the public interest
is not served by preventing the normal exercise of commercial func-
tions."' In some cases, adherence to the cartel as a prerequisite to
engaging in a particular trade has been forbidden and a fixed price
scheme whereby all prices were made proportionate to a maximum
124 Van Themaat, op. cit. supra note 106, at 3.
125Law of May 24, 1935, Law on the Statutory Application of Industrial Agreements
to Non-Participants. The French text is to be found in Notes et Etudes Documentaires,
No. 1681 (Paris), Nov. 21, 1952, pp. 14-15.
" For an English language version of the text as proposed, see U.N. EcoSoc Council
Of. Rec. 19th Sess., Supp. No. 3, at 53-57 (E/2671) (1954).
12 Van Themaat, op. cit. supra note 106, at 3.
.2 For an English language version, see Restrictive Business Practices, U.N. EcoSoc
Council Off. Rec. 16th Sess., Supp. No. I1B, at 143-46 (E/2379/add. 2) (1953).
12. Heater and Furnace Cartel-Nederlandse Staatscourant, No. 60, 1950.
'"Bookdealers Cartel-Nederlandse Staatscourant, No. 225, 1950.
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markup was banned. 3 ' Restrictions on the liberty of dealers have
been banned where they lacked precision and where violations re-
sulted in severe punishment by the cartel. Only public and specific
restrictions were allowed.' 3' Price fixing, which includes a whole-
sale markup in industries where sales are direct from manufacturer
to retailer, has also been banned.'33 Finally, restriction designed to
prevent consumers of materials from pooling their purchases have
been prohibited.""
Several more recent cases will be examined in some detail. A re-
quest for a legalized market-sharing arrangement for milk distri-
bution in Amsterdam was permitted under specific conditions. In
that city of one million inhabitants there were one thousand milk
distributors. In some two hundred other markets, where market-
sharing arrangements existed, it was found that the price of milk was
approximately twenty per cent cheaper, but service to the consumer
was poor. In order to ensure both a fair price and good service, a
market-sharing agreement was authorized on the condition that
each consumer have at least three distributors from whom to choose
for service. The indications are that the arrangement has led to the
desired result. 3'
Where the interests of the Netherlands are concerned, the Dutch
are not unwilling to battle a cartel of international scope. The Dutch
government has encouraged the building of a soda ash plant in the
northern area, despite the fact that Solvay of Belgium, through
cartel arrangements, has practical Europe-wide control. Holland had
previously depended on foreign sources for this vital material."'
Probably the most spectacular recent action has dealt with the
radio cartel. On March 15, 1955, the Minister of Economic Affairs
and the Minister for Government Industrial Organizations suspend-
ed the cartel arrangements between the Central Bureau to Protect
the Interests of Radio Traders (Cebubera), the Netherlands Associa-
tion of Radio Wholesalers (NORG), and the Netherlands Associa-
tion of Radio Retailers (NVRD).
These arrangements required manufacturers and importers of ra-
dios to establish gross selling prices for their radios or net purchas-
ing prices for traders. The members of Cebubera were required to
... Medical Instruments Cartel-Nederlandse Staatscourant, No. 31, 1952, No. 148, 1952.
"32 Cycle and Automobile Cartel-Nederlandse Staatscourant, No. 150, 1950.
113 Beer and Mineral Water Cartel-Nederlandse Staatscourant, No. 156, 1952.
'34Flour Millers Cartel where the attempt was to prevent bakers from jointly pur-
chasing, Nederlandse Staatscourant, No. 18, 1952.
"'Van Themaat, op. cit. supra note 106, at 9-10.
ta Article entitled "Dutch Plans Stir Soda Ash Cartel," N.Y. Times, May I, 1954.
[Vol. 12
1958] FOREIGN ANTITRUST LAWS
sell radios under recognized (as distinguished from private) brands,
they could not sell on consignment, could not organize trade-in
campaigns, and could not deliver directly to consumers. NORG
members were subject to the ban on consignment selling as well as
a prohibition on finance plans and direct sales to consumers. The
NVRD members had even more strict and, in some cases, unusual
restrictions. They included prohibition of making radios, taking
back an old radio without selling a new one, selling to fellow mem-
bers, opening a branch store or showroom, and selling radios in
the open market. There were also the following obligations: to ad-
here to specified trade-in rules including price fixing on sales of
used sets; to keep secret the trade-in prices; to give no other service
or guarantee than that provided by the manufacturer; to sell no
more than two radios per season to the same consumer and his
family; and to finance credit sales at the highest legal rate of in-
terest. These practices were found to have increased the selling mark-
ups from 33 per cent to a level between 42 and 50 per cent. In
the case of certain models the profit at retail had been 100 per cent
of wholesale prices. Manufacturers and importers were found to
have been at the mercy of the dealers as a result of these practices."'
'SrNederlandse Staatscourant, March 15, 1955, after listing the practices enumerated
in the text, the suspension order states:
Considering that these regulations have brought about exclusive trade between radio
manufacturers, importers, wholesalers and retailers;
Considering that these agreements and regulations are cartels in the sense of the
Cartel Decree of 1941;
Considering that the greater part of radio trade is bound by them;
Considering that this has contributed to an almost complete absence of price com-
petition;
that the rigid fixing of retail selling prices has forced manufacturers and importers
to bid for the favor of the traders;
that as a result the maximum discounts on the selling price when buying the largest
possible quantities in retail trade have increased from 33 percent (3 percent purchase
tax included) in 1950 to 42-50 percent in 1954;
that often special discounts were given, for special reasons, e.g. old models or demcn-
stration radios, as a result of which profits of 50 percent of selling prices, i.e. 100
percent of wholesale prices often have been made in the retail business;
that this is the more undesirable because radios are rather high priced articles which
nonetheless belong to the essential needs of every family;
that the mechanism of competition has worked badly in this sector;
that the previous maximum discounts of 30 percent (3 percent purchase tax excluded)
are assumed to be adequate;
Considering that there are reasons to consider declaring unenforceable the agreements
between Cebubera, NORG and NVRD, the regulations of these organizations and
the agreements between their members;
that these agreements and regulations, which (a) deal directly or indirectly with the
fixation by manufacturers and importers of consumer prices or purchasing prices and
mark-ups and their enforcement or (b) aim to bolster up these prices, especially by
exclusive trade, are unacceptable because they have created, supported and kept up
prices and mark-ups which are far too high and therefore contrary to the general
interest;
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By an order of January 20, 1956, the suspension was replaced
by a permanent decree enjoining collective maintenance of sales
prices, the exclusive dealing arrangements, and the mandatory pro-
visions on gross price. In explaining the reasons for the action, the
Minister pointed to the hiring of agents provocateurs for enforce-
ment and the restriction on individual liberty.3 '
The interest of American business in Holland is growing. In the
area of wholly owned subsidiaries alone, there was an increase of
that the Cartel Commission has been asked for advice on these agreements and regu-
lations;
that because of the serious disadvantages, also in view of the present wage and price
policy and the fact that the pertinent goods are brought by virtually every family,
there are important reasons to take immediate measures; that these reasons justify
suspension of the pertinent cartel;
that at this moment it is not justified to prohibit vertical price fixation between a
supplier and his customers;
by virtue of the Cartel Suspending Act (Statute Book 1951, 107);
DECIDES:
1. The aforementioned regulations are suspended, except those on vertical price fixa-
tion in individual contracts between a supplier and his customers. Excluded from this
exception are the stipulations in said contracts which do not directly fix the con-
sumer price of the goods covered by the contract.
2. This decision becomes effective on the third day after it has been published in
the Netherlands Official Gazette.
The Minister of Economic Affairs,
J. Zijlstra
S Nederlandse Staatscourant, Jan. 20, 1956. The decree reads as follows:
The following stipulations of the cartel arrangements are declared nul [sic] and void,
so far as they refer to the trade in radio articles or radio contract articles:
1. the stipulations aiming at collective maintenance of sales prices in the second
or third hand fixed by manufacturers or importers.
2. the stipulation in regard to exclusive economic intercourse.
3. the stipulations in regard to mandatory fixation of gross sales prices.
A summary of the exposition of motives for the decree follows:
The Minister was cognizant of the fact that the CEBUBERA (Central Bureau for
the Protection of the Radio Trade), NORG (Netherlands Radio Wholesalers Or-
ganization), and NVRD (Netherlands Association of Radio Retailers) had made
mandatory regulations for their members, which regulations should fall under the
operation of the Cartel Decree of 1941. This complex of regulations was considered
to be extraordinarily stringent and supported by an effective system of exclusive
economic intercourse. It included the obligation for the members of the CEBUBERA
to fix gross consumer prices, which were enforced by a strict system of investigating,
prosecuting and judging violators.
Although it should be acknowledged that in view of previous chaotic conditions in
the trade, such arrangements exercised a constructive influence in the prewar period,
the gradual extension of the system resulted in a growing rigidity in the wholesale
and retail price structure. This should be considered detrimental to the public in-
terest, the more so as fear for return of the prewar chaotic conditions is unjustified.
Generally applied individual vertical price agreements always carry with them a
certain element of price rigidity, but systematic enforcement of price agreements
intensifies this rigidity. This condition has hampered development of varying distri-
bution methods, has created injustice to individual entrepreneurs, has limited indivi-
dual business liberty, and has led to competition between manufacturers and importers
resulting in excessive retail profit margins and prices. This enforcement machinery
finally included a system of agents provacateurs over dealers. The methods used have
thus condemned themselves.
Therefore, the collective price maintenance system is considered to be contrary to
public interest. Mandatory regulations would only be acceptable if they were instituted
to resist abuses. The radio retail trade is already protected against too large admit-
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twenty-two from 1947 to 1953.1' On the basis of the past cases
and the new act, certain observations may be made. Restrictive ar-
rangements which take the form of rationalization cartels will be
permitted, and obligatory adherence by those wishing to participate
in that branch of trade or industry will be countenanced. In order
to qualify, these arrangements must demonstrate a restraining in-
fluence on price and more efficient distribution. All of this is, of
course, subject to the actual interpretation of the rules of the Com-
mon Market. Boycotts and harsh private penalties for infractions
of cartel regulations will probably not be countenanced. Resale price
maintenance and price discrimination when not hedged with ar-
rangements leading to unfair prices will also be permitted as long
as there is some indication of concern for the public interest.
C. Germany
The German legislation became effective on January 1, 1958,140
and it has not yet been possible to obtain official copies of rulings.
However, on January 13, 1958, at Chicago, a German attorney who
was a member of Parliament was able to speak of the authorization
granted to a rationalization cartel.14 ' This cartel provides a common
selling agency for manufacturers of sewer pipe. The argument, ap-
parently accepted by the Cartel Authority, was that several hun-
dred sizes of pipe were necessary to supply the needs of various
communities. Scheduling of production and ease in placing orders
were successfully advanced as reasons for allowing the cartel.
D. Norway
The trend in Norwegian enforcement is indicated in the earlier
discussion of legislation, particularly with reference to the new ban
on resale price maintenance. Among the best documented cartel
actions is one dating back to 1927 and dealing with breweries. One
major feature of that cartel agreement was the limitation on the
tance of new dealers by the Settlement Decree for Electrotechnical Trades of 1949.
At present manufacturers and wholesalers are prevented individually from fixing
prices at such a level as they, for their particular business, consider most desirable.
They also lack the liberty under the existing cartel to abstain from the agreement
if they do not agree with strict price control. These aspects are also considered to be
contrary to the public welfare.
Therefore, the Minister has decided to convert his suspension of March 1955 into a
permanent dissolution.
The officers of the Ministry's Economic Control Service will execute the new decree
and, if necessary, utilize judicial procedures.
"" Netherlands Industrial Institute Press Release (New York) Nov. 1953.
'"°See Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb, op. cit. supra note 107, S 109(1). For a full
analysis of the legislation, see Kronstein, Cartels Under the New German Cartel Statute,
11 Vand. L. Rev. 271 (1958).
141 Id. 5 5.
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sale of beer brewed in Oslo in other areas having a brewery. The
Oslo breweries were found to be more efficient than those elsewhere.
Therefore, it was ordered that the restriction be dissolved so as to
bring down the price of beer.""
Norway also has a tradition of prohibiting arrangements that
restrict freedom of entry.' Arrangements involving tying clauses
are generally stricken.'"
Under the present complex of Norwegian legislation which deals
with prices, profits, and dividends, it is fair to assume that any
arrangement that domestically could adversely affect free pricing
or which could lead to higher prices will be prohibited.
E. Japan
The Japanese legislation is a combination of a registration law
and a Commission of Enquiry, utilizing some concepts of American
antitrust law and some features more common to the European ex-
perience. Cartels may be legalized, as may resale price maintenance,
all as exceptions to general provisions against restraints of trade.
The major agency concerned is the Fair Trade Commission. The
first version of law was born of the occupation, but when that
terminated, the wider legalization of restrictive practices became
lawful by amendments.'"
The administration of the law has been -for the most part con-
sistent with the principle that most restrictions are bad. " Among
the agreements that have been stricken down are: (1) agreement
between banks fixing interest rates on loans and deposits;"" (2)
agreement between plywood manufacturers leading to identical bid-
ding;" (3) agreements between motion picture producers and ex-
141Supra note 27, at 58-65. The cartel was created in 1901 and first reported in 1920.
A subsequent agreement was negotiated in 1931 designed to run until 2030, and this also
became subject to governmental modification.
1 Bookdealers Association, Trustkontrollen, No. 5, 1935. Note, however, that similar
limitations, particularly when overall control of the import of an important commodity
are involved, may be permitted. E.g., Tobacco Manufacturer's Federation, see Report of
the Ministry of Finance, The Price Act, Enclosure No. 1 to Oslo, Dispatch No. 786,
June 3, 1954, p. 68.
Radio Cartel, Trustkontrollen, No. 2, 1936.
145 See Control of Restrictive Trade Practices in Japan, Restrictive Trade Practices
Specialists Study Team, Japan Productivity Center, Tokyo, 1958, pp. 3-20.
148During the first ten years, the Fair Trade Commission served more than 150 no-
tices of violations. Forty-five were contested, of which 11 were dismissed. Eight decisions
have been appealed to the Tokyo Higher Court, and in the 7 decisions reported to date,
the FTC has generally been upheld. However, the court has found that unreasonable re-
straint of trade does not include vertical combinations and that members of a trade asso-
ciation are not personally liable. On both of these issues, the views of the FTC were
thereby stricken down. See Control of Restrictive Trade Practices in Japan, Restrictive
Trade Practices Specialists Study Team, Japan Productivity Center, Tokyo, 1958, p. 16.141Decision, Dec. 22, 1947, id. at 112.
14'Decision, Aug. 30, 1949, id. at 123.
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hibitors forbidding double features, setting admission prices, and
establishing block booking; 4' (4) agreement between an electric
railway and bus company to regulate service, so as not to compete;
5 0
(5) agreement fixing silk export prices;"' (6) arrangement between
bank and silk manufacturer controlling eleven silk manufacturers
by loans so as to fix price;'"' (7) agreement for territorial allocations
in the sale of coke;"' (8) agreement setting the wholesale price of
cosmetics;" 4 (9) conspiracy to fix prices on petroleum products;...
and (10) arrangement to control dairy prices by control over loans
for purchase of stock coupled with a requirement that output be
sold to certain dairies."'
There can be little doubt that as to many aspects of the domestic
economy the enforcement has been on a strict basis. Yet, there is
every evidence that the weakening of the law since 1947 has been
a response to increasing restrictions imposed on Japanese exports in
other parts of the world. As the impact of such restriction creates
more imbalance in the home market, it is likely that greater utiliza-
tion will be made of the general language which does permit re-
strictive agreements and cartels. Certainly, such a trend already ex-
ists in the export area."'
Of the greatest interest to American businessmen is the law gov-
erning licensing arrangements. As it has become more difficult to op-
erate subsidiaries in Japan, the licensing device has increased in popu-
larity. International licenses with restrictons on exchanges of techni-
cal knowledge and other forms of restrictions are no longer forbid-
den." '
F. Ireland
Thus far, the Fair Trade Commission has held five public enquir-
ies. The items concerned were the following: supply and distribution
of radios and accessories;"' building materials and components;...
4
aDecision, May 13, 1948; Decision, July 16, 1949, id. at 131, 137.
'0 Decision, May 2, 1950, id. at 142.
"' Decision, May 12, 1950, id. at 145.
"' Decision, July 13, 1950, id. at 148.
11 Decision, Sept. 26, 1950, id. at 153.
". Decision, March 15, 1951, id. at 169.
"' Note that Standard Vacuum Oil Company was the only one of the companies
charged that was found not to have violated the law. The FTC decision was affirmed by
the Tokyo High Court on November 9, 1956. Decision, Feb. 20, 1953, id. at 176.
15°Recommendation and Proposed Order, Feb. 2, 1957, id. at 190.
"S7Id. at 18-19.
s18 Id. at 8.
".. Fair Trade Commission, Report of Enquiry Into the Conditions Which Obtain in
Regard to the Supply and Distribution of Radio Sets and Accessories. Restrictive Trade
Practices (Radios) Order, 1955 (S. 1 No. 102 of 1955). Restrictive Trade Practices
(Confirmation of Order) Act, 1956. This and subsequently cited Irish publications may
be obtained from the Government Publications Sales Offices, G.P.O. Arcade, Dublin.
... Fair Trade Commission, Report of Enquiry in Relation to the Supply and Dis-
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medicines, infant foods, and toilet preparations; 1 motor cars;'12 and
groceries and provisions. ' The commodities were chosen in view of
the legislative emphasis on supply and distribution so as to cover
the broadest possible areas of trade.
The recommendation and orders have been made on the basis of
certain fundamental objectives such as insuring freedom of entry,
equity in providing supplies, and freedom of pricing for manufac-
turer and trader. Thus, trade association powers limiting freedom of
entry have been abolished, and entry is dependent on the terms and
conditions of individual suppliers. Horizontal price fixing and
market-sharing arrangements have been condemned, and, in most
cases, resale price maintenance has been condemned whether enforce-
ment is collective or by an individual. However, to prevent price
cutting of an extreme nature, suppliers have been empowered to with-
hold supplies from those selling below the price paid for the item.
On the other hand, the Commission has refused to work out a mini-
mum price scheme tied to cost because of the danger of collective
price or margin fixing.
6 4
The small size of the Irish economy, as is also true in Norway, has
made the Commission very conscious of price problems and the ques-
tion of freedom of entry which, in a small market, is complicated
by the relatively few competing products available. It would seem
that all sorts of production agreements involving restrictions and
similar licensing agreements would be legal for American interests as
long as they in no way inhibited the supply of goods, including the
importation of products and the development of low prices. Agree-
ments that can avoid such pitfalls will be safe as long as the Euro-
pean Free Trade Area does not become a reality and bring with it
possible further prohibitions such as those applicable in the Common
Market.
tribution of Building Materials and Components. Restrictive Trade Practices (Building
Materials) Order, 1955 (S. 1 No. 187 of 1955). Restrictive Trade Practices (Confirmation
of Order) (No. 2) Act, 1956.
... Walsh, op. cit. supra note 52, at 9.
"'aFair Trade Commission, Report of Enquiry Into the Conditions Which Obtain
in Regard to the Supply and Distribution of Motor Vehicles, Tires, Other Spare Parts
and Accessories. Restrictive Trade Practices (Motor Cars) Order, 1956 (S. 1 No. 86 of
1956).
163 Walsh, op. cit. supra note 52, at 9.
14 See notes 159-63 supra. In addition, see the Fair Trade Commission, Annual Re-
ports. These have been issued since 1953 and contain information concerning the establish-
ment of fair-trading rules. Among the commodities for which such rules have been issued
are ropes, cordage, and twine; nails and screws; earthenware and china tableware; cutlery,
spoons, and forks; petrol; electric light bulbs; sole leather; files and hacksaw blades; dry




The Restrictive Practices Act dates from August 2, 1956,' and
succeeds and amends earlier enactments involving the enquiry tech-
nique.'66 Monopolies, parent-subsidiary agreements, export agree-
ments, exclusive-dealing contracts between two parties, and know-
how agreements are outside of the general scope of the act, as are
patent-licensing agreements. 6 ' Agreements subject to registration
are, with few exceptions, to be made public,"' and this is further evi-
dence of the already noted trend toward more publicity in the field
of restrictive practices. Export agreements are to be registered with
the Board of Trade and are not public." 9 As of January 1958, 1,850
agreements had been submitted for registration, of which 1,550 had
been screened sufficiently to permit their placement on the public
register. ' There is evidence that the public registration requirement,
as hoped, has led to the modification or abandonment of many re-
strictions."1
On order of the Board of Trade,7 the Registrar of Agreements
takes agreements to be examined before a special tribunal which de-
termines to what extent the restrictions are consistent with the pub-
lic interest.' The act provides for seven basic defenses on which
parties to a restrictive agreement may rely: (1) the restriction pro-
tects users against physical injury; (2) without the restriction users
would lose a substantial benefit; (3) the restriction counteracts anti-
165Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68.
66 Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act, 1948, 11 & 12
Geo. 6, c. 66; Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Commission Act, 1953, 1 & 2 Eliz.
2, c. 51.
16 Monopolies of scale are now the concern of the reconstituted Monopolies and Re-
strictive Practices Commission, Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956,
4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, amending the 1948 and 1953 acts cited supra note 166. For cor-
porate subsidiaries, see Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, S 8(9).
Note that S 154 of the Companies Act, 1948, 11 & 12 Geo. 6, c. 38, treats a company
owned in equal proportions by two other companies as an independent company. Export
agreements are treated in Part III of the 1956 act and in § 8(8); exclusive dealing,
8(3); know-how agreements, § 8(s); and patent licensing agreements, 5 8(4).
"'Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, 11(4).
'"1Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, 5 31(1).
"'See unpublished manuscript by Rupert L. Sich, C.B., Registrar of Restrictive
Trading Agreements, International Conference on Restrictive Business Practices, Chicago,
Jan. 1958.
171 Mr. Peter Thorneycroft, President of the Board of Trade, on the Order for the
Second Reading of the Bill, said in regard to registrations: "Industries at this very mo-
ment are looking at their arrangements very closely. They are deciding what they are
going to keep, and in consequence publicly register. . . . It is my hope and belief that
quite a number of devices which may have been appropriate 25 or 30 years ago may
now be quietly dropped." Hansard, March 6, 1956, Col. 1942. Mr. Sich, op. cit. supra
note 170, at 10, believes that about one third of the registered agreements were modified
(made less restrictive) before registration.
... Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, § 1 (2).
.. Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, SS 2-5, 20-22.
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competitive acts by a third party not involved in the agreement;
(4) the restriction is necessary to balance the power of a supplier
who holds a monopoly or dominant position in the market; (5) the
restriction will prevent unemployment; (6) the restriction prevents
a reduction in export trade; and (7) the restriction is necessary to
the maintenance of other restrictions which are deemed in them-
selves to be legal."' No decisions have as yet come down from the
Restrictive Practices Court. It is expected that approximately 200
agreements involving forty products will shortly be scrutinized and
that stare decisis will lead to the nullification or modification of
other agreements similar to those found by the tribunal to be against
the public interest."
However, two cases have recently been decided interpreting the
effect of the act in two respects. Re Austin Motor Co. Agreements'"
is authority for the proposition that the substitution of bilateral ex-
clusive-dealing agreements for multilateral agreements, which would
have been registrable, where the bilateral agreements together have
the same substance as the multilateral agreements, does not subject
the bilateral agreements to registration. County Laboratories, Ltd.
v. 1. Mindel, Ltd." supports the proposition that actual notice of a
resale price maintenance scheme must be given to a dealer before he
is bound. Thus, it would seem likely that notice through a statement
in a trade publication would not be sufficient. Express knowledge of
the price restriction must be shown.
There is some indication that the ban on enforcement of resale
price maintenance by collective action of a trade association or the
like... has already created difficulties in the enforcement of price fix-
ing by individual suppliers similar to that experienced in the United
States. Some retailers have begun to suggest collective action against
those who have abandoned resale price maintenance,'' a practice
which is registrable and illegal under the act."'
American firms doing business in the United Kingdom through
14 Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, S 21.
"'Sich, op. cit. supra note 170, at 11, 17. More than twenty-five per cent of the
parties notified that an agreement will be taken before the court have cancelled the agree-
ments or the restrictions.
178 [1957] 3 All E.R. 62 (Ch.). The bilateral agreements, as exclusive dealing agree-
ments, come under 5 8(3) of the act.
17 [1957] 1 All E.R. 806 (Ch.); id. at 861.
.7 Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, 4 & s Eliz. 2, c. 68, 5 25.
"'West, Price Maintenance in the U.K., Cartel, Vol. 7, No. 3 (London), July 1957,
p. 79 et seq. For an opinion that the ban on collective enforcement of resale price main-
tenance will not lessen price fixing, see Tresise, The U.K. Restrictive Practices Act, Car-
tel, Vol. 7, No. 4 (London), Oct. 1957, pp. 110, 115.
aSs Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1956, 4 & 5 Eliz. 2, c. 68, SS 6(1)(b), 24(2).
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subsidiaries or by licensing agreements are free from public scrutiny
of their arrangements as long as the licensee or subsidiary does not
join some association or agreement requiring registration. Once there
is an attempt to engage in restrictive practices beyond the primary
relationship, there is danger that the publicity attendant to the re-
strictions might well supply leads to our own Department of Justice.
H. Sweden
The currently applicable Swedish legislation""1 forbids, without
administrative permission, resale price maintenance and collusive
tendering of bids on public projects."' s Restrictive agreements are
to be registered" 3 and the Cartel Office is to conduct investigations
into competitive restrictions. s4 Uniquely, the Swedish system does
not empower the authorities to change or modify restrictive agree-
ments. At-the most, the power is given to the Freedom of Commerce
Board to negotiate for changes,"" and in the rare instance where
negotiations dealing with restrictions of major importance causing
abnormally high prices fail, the King (government) may for no
more than one year set a maximum price.'
Negotiations may not touch restrictions affecting competition out-
side Sweden without the King's permission. This permission may be
granted only to the extent Sweden has international obligations re-
quiring such activity. 
sT
The cornerstones of the Swedish system are publicity 8 and belief
in reasonable self-regulation. This had led to the development of a
private decartelization bureau in the Federation of Swedish Indus-
" The author is indebted to Dr. Hans B. Thorell, op. cit. supra note 25, for an
English translation of the following laws and regulations: Public Law to Counteract
Restrictions on Competition in Business in Certain Instances, Law of Sept. 25, 1953,
amended, June 1, 1956, amendments becoming effective Jan. 1, 1957; Public Law Con-
cerning the Obligation to Submit Information as to Conditions of Price and Competition
of June 1, 1956, effective Jan. 1, 1957; Royal Proclamation Giving Certain Regulations
Under the Law Concerning the Obligations to Submit Information as to Conditions of
Price and Competition, effective Jan. 1, 1957; and Rules and Regulations for the State
Price and Cartel Office, issued by the King, effective Jan. 1, 1957.
... Restriction on Competition Law § 2-4.
"I Obligation to Submit Information Law §5 1, 3.
114 Rules and Regulations issued by the King SS 2-4.
... Restriction on Competition Law 55 1, 5.
188 Restriction on Competition Law 5 21.
18. Restriction on Competition Law S 6.
a Restriction on Competition Law S 23, requires that meetings of the Freedom of
Commerce Board be public except where professional secrets are involved or negotiations
would be hindered. Obligation to Submit Information Law § 1, calls for the promotion
of public knowledge concerning price and competition. Of the Rules and Regulations
issued by the King, § 2 obliges the State Price and Cartel Office to promote public
knowledge of price and competition, S 5 requires a public information and reporting pro-
gram, and 5 7 calls for the issuance of a publication known as "Price and Cartel Prob-
lems."
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tries, which operates on the theory that competition is desirable. Ap-
parently, this form of Swedish "control" has been effective. Between
1946 and 1956, under legislation similar to that now in force, 40
per cent of the 1,660 registered agreements were suspended, and of
the remainder, 20 per cent were modified by lessening restrictions."9
The investigative procedure also seems to have been effective. The
petroleum cartel investigation was most useful in providing informa-
tion. for a similar study in this country.9 ' American interests in
Sweden should know that any agreements restricting competition
within Sweden will be publicized upon registration."9 ' Further, they
will have to contend with the private decartelization program which
may well be more exacting than governmental programs in other
countries.
I. France
With but two exceptions 9' the French Government has main-
tained official silence concerning the work and accomplishments of
the Technical Commission for Ententes. The Commission and its
Secretariat have accomplished much that is positive in character, and
it would seem that much public dissatisfaction with high prices
could be avoided if publicity were given to the work of the Com-
mission. 9 ' As indicated earlier, the basis for secrecy is an administra-
tive regulation of the Minister of Economic Affairs, which appears to
'S Irsten, Voluntary Decartelization in Sweden, Cartel, Vol. 6, No. 4 (London),
Oct. 1956, pp. 116-18.
... Actually the Petroleum Investigation was carried on by a parliamentary committee
authorized in 1945 and reporting in 1947. See Staff Report of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, Senate Subcommittee on Monopoly, Select Committee on Small Business, 82d Cong.,
2d Sess., The International Petroleum Cartel 280-311 (Comm. Print 1952).
..' Examples of registrations involving American firms are: Cartel Register, 857, S. S.
White Dental Mfg. Co., Philadelphia; 858, Kerr Dental Mfg. Co., Detroit; 859, Ransom
and Randolph Co., Toledo; 860, Richmond Dental Mfg. Co., Charlotte; and 866, Ritter
Co., Rochester. These American firms and Swedish, German, British, Norwegian, Swiss,
and Danish firms, under related numbers, reported a price-fixing and exclusive distribution
agreement. Cartel Register, 890-919 reports an agreement between the Swedish subsidiary
of United Shoe Machinery and Swedish shoe manufacturers concerning the licensing of
shoe machinery equipment. American manufacturers of fiberglass and glass wool will be
interested to learn that Cartel Register, 1135 reflects an agreement giving a Swedish en-
terprise exclusive rights to manufacture such items and the patents necessary. It further
ensures against foreign competition. The undertaking is by a Dutch firm whose relation-
ship to American firms is at this time unknown.
19 The Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, in response to written questions from
a member of the Assembly, provided a general statement of the Commission's work and
a description of the scope of the legislation in force. He characterized the trend toward
competition as beneficial. Debats Parlamentaires, Assemblee Nationale, Journal Ofliciel,
Oct. 19, and Oct. 26, 1957. M. Rene Jaume, Chief of the Commission's Secretariat, in
an unpublished manuscript, International Conference on Restrictive Business Practices,
Chicago, Jan. 1958, discusses the work of the Commission in one short paragraph after
devoting eleven pages to the legal structure and administrative procedures.
"saGoldstein, France's First Discount House, Harper's Magazine, Vol. 213, No. 1279,
Dec. 1956, pp. 53-56.
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be based on pressure coming from certain sectors of the business com-
munity. There is every indication that this pressure is abating, and
it is likely that secrecy will shortly be terminated. Thus, American
enterprises cannot rely much longer on the lack of publicity.
The work of the Secretariat is carried on by less than a dozen
professional civil servants who supervise approximately thirty highly
trained investigators from the staff of agents maintained by the Min-
istry. This small group has been able to provide exhaustive docu-
mentation in more than forty instances since the work began upon
installation of the Commission on April 9, 1954.194 Two annual re-
ports to the Minister have issued since then, and the substance of
these reports will be considered before approaching the private liti-
gation and other public matters under the legislative system in force.
The first six pages of the first report are devoted to an analysis of
the development of the legislation and the role of the Commission
and Minister.19 Two important observations are made by the Com-
mission: (1) that the decree of August 9, 1953, is a logical develop-
ment arising from earlier legislation and not a towering monument
of revolutionary character; and (2) that the legislation is designed
to do more than strike down anti-competitive arrangements. It is
expected to accomplish a much more difficult task, viz., to educate
concerning habitual abuses which are prejudicial to the public wel-
fare and to lead to acceptance of the necessity for rectification.
The Commission devoted the last eight months of 1954, its first
eight months of existence, to developing its procedures and tech-
niques and to building up its investigative dossiers. The Secretariat
was, of course, continually at work, and the Commission met only
on June 7, November 6, and December 18, 1954. The Commission
met eight times in 1955.
The 1955 efforts of the Commission involved nine matters in
which a recommendation to the Minister or a decisive procedural or
jurisdictional decision was made. Six other cases were before the
Commission but had not reached a final stage, and fourteen others
were in various stages of investigations.
Among the problems which the Commission faced was its compe-
tence to investigate and recommend on matters not submitted direct-
ly by the Minister but by outside parties. As to such matters, three
rules evolved. If the matter were entirely outside the jurisdiction
194 Much of the material concerning the Secretariat and informed opinion are the result
of personal interviews for which no published documentation exists.
195 Rapport Annual au Ministre Charge des Affaires Economiques (Paris), Dec. 31,
1955, [hereinafter cited as 1st Report].
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of the Commission, it would be sent to the proper authorities. In
particularly important cases within the scope of the Commission's
competence, the matter will be assigned provisionally to a rapporteur
for preliminary investigation to determine whether the Commission
will make a full investigation. In the case of ordinary complaints,
they will be referred to the Minister for his decision as to whether
or not the Commission should make a full investigation.'"
Because knowledge of the fate of the Commission's recommenda-
tion is essential to its work, the Minister has agreed to advise the
Commission of the fate of its recommendations."'
The matter of publicity is a delicate one which the Commission
wishes to solve in some fashion which would enlighten the public
without naming individuals or corporations. ' Discussion will be
limited to those reported cases in which a recommendation has been
made by the Commission and will not mention matters which are
still under investigation as of the close of the second report, October
19, 1957.
1. Reported Cases With a Recommendation by the Commission
a. Household Soap Cartel.-The recommendation in this case was
made on April 23, 1955, and subsequently the Minister adopted the
recommendation. The cartel was run by a special organization known
as la Societe Auxiliaire de la Savonnerie Francaise. The function of
this organization was to administer control over soap production by
a quota system with penalties for overproduction and indemnities
'for underproduction, thus controlling the profits enjoyed by the
participants. The recommendation called for government assistance
in converting the industry to a more competitive form that would
permit full exploitation of the potential to produce more and to
realize the full potential of the market.' In the course of hearing
the interested parties, a denial that a cartel existed was entered. This
was interpreted by the Commission as foreclosing or estopping the
parties from pleading article 59 ter, which establishes as a ground
for exemption a cartel's beneficial effect on economic progress.!
This is a cartel in which there are American interests, and it is hoped
that American stockholders will now benefit from the opportunity
given to recognize the full potential of their French affiliates.
19 1st Report, pp. 4-5, 7-8.
19 Id. at 13-14. This has been done in only two instances reflected in the reports-
soap and yeast.
'8 Id. at 24; Rapport Annual au Ministre Charge des Affaires Economiques (Paris),
Annee 1956, Oct. 19, 1957, pp. 16-17 [hereinafter cited as 2d Report].
'" 1st Report, pp. 14, 16-17, 20, 22.
28°2d Report, p. 11.
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b. Yeast Cartel.-This cartel is described in footnote 91. The Min-
ister has adopted the Commission's recommendations in this case. In
the Commission's study of this cartel, attention was given to the
problem of maintaining the industry as an integral part of the
French economy. The Commission was impressed with the extent
to which the rigid maintenance of commercial positions by the car-
tel prevented the better placed enterprises from reaching their po-
tential. The fact that those who used yeast had no choice as to price,
service, or supplier was particularly condemned. Here again it was
recommended that government agencies be utilized to provide both
technical and psychological assistance in the transitional period.
c. Grindstone and Abrasives Cartel.-The recommendation by the
Commission was made on December 17, 1955. Here the cartel was
operated by a central organization known as Union Industrielle.
Arrangements were based on a price list from which were calculated
the minimum prices charged by each factory to each class of pur-
chasers."' The entente argued that it was entitled to an exemption
under article 59 ter because, by the elimination of price competition,
it was possible to concentrate on the establishment of quality com-
petition, thereby encouraging the development of a national industry
enhancing economic progress. This argument was not accepted, and
the Commission recommended the abandonment of the price prac-
tices."'1 The industry is one in which there are American interests.
d. Glass Products for Electrotechnical Use.-In this industry no
written or formal cartel arrangement existed as was true in the first
three cases examined. The Commission looked to the facts of the
market place and found that two manufacturers dominated the in-
dustry, apparently using a common price scale. However, it was
demonstrated that the common-pricing arrangement was not used
and that the sales conditions of each of the producers had evolved
into a clear-cut difference as to price. In the recommendation of
November 19, 1955, the Commission absolved the industry of the
charges, but it expressly reserved the right to examine the entire
glass industry on the basis of facts developed in this investigation."3
e. Magnesium Cartel.-Here the arrangement was through a com-
mon sales agency, la Societe Generale du Magnesium. The cartel was
"I Id. at 11, 14-16, 19-20, 22. It is interesting to note that No. 847 on the Swedish
Cartel Register concerns an agreement to use a 1923 American price list as the basis for
calculating current grindstone prices.
202 1st Report, p. 21. Here also the Commission notes the failure of this and other
cartels examined to prove that it opened up new markets which would effectively assist the
exportation of French products.
203 Id. at IS, 23.
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based on the monopoly rights derived from patents, which served to
exclude those desirous of using processes and materials. The licensing
arrangements created obligations to give preferential treatment in
the matter of supply and price to licensors and to follow certain
limitations on the use and resale of the metal. This investigation
brought the Commission for the first time into the conflict between
the protection granted by patent laws and the policy of the' legisla-
tion designed to encourage competition. The Commission indicated
that it had no intention of breaking down the patent laws, but it
also stated that the domestic and international impact on the econo-
my of the practices brought them within the scope of the legisla-
tion. Thus, according to the recommendation of October 8, 1955,
patent rights in themselves are not sufficient to provide a defense
to the law, particularly where it is found that the elimination of
competition between producers also adversely affects the national
defense." ' Thus, the French have begun to develop a theory of
limited patent monopoly which is not unknown to students of our
law, and the factor of national defense is reminiscent of the findings
made in this country during the early years of World War I105
f. Domestic Water Transport of Coal.-This matter first came to
the Commission by a private complaint,"°' was sent to the Minister
on December 18, 1954, submitted by the Minister to the Commission
on May 24, 1955, and the Commission recommended "absolution"
on February 18, 1956. Here the lack of competition was found to
result from external causes beyond the control of the entente.
Though no specific legislative or administrative act could be found
that gave the entente a defense as contemplated in paragraph one
of article 59 ter, it was found that the price arrangements did result
indirectly from governmental controls."'
g. Metal Drum Production Cartel.- This cartel was the subject of
a recommendation to the Minister on June 27, 1955, and the re-
sultant denunciation of the cartel by the participants was examined
by the Commission, which found re-establishment of competition
in the industry. The cartel had operated on the basis of a tacit mar-
ket-sharing agreement. Because of the voluntary abandonment of
the practices, the recommendation did not suggest any further ac-
tion except surveillance of the industry in order to avoid or catch
any reappearance of the abandoned practices. In this case the Com-
2 04 Id. at 16-18, 20.
205 See notes 9, 11 supra.
206 1st Report, p. 12.
207 2d Report, pp. 2, 11, 14.
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mission had an opportunity to study the status of international car-
tels, a problem which the Common Market will raise, and found that
such cartels were under its jurisdiction to the extent that the domes-
tic economy was affected."'
h. Electric Lamp Manufacturing Cartel.-This cartel, which has
been the subject of a British study... and an American antitrust
210case, was the subject of a recommendation forwarded to the Min-
ister on May 26, 1955. The cartel utilized production quotas with
penalties for overproduction and indemnities for underproduction,
along with refusals to deal with or to supply those who did not
maintain prices. The organism controlling the industry was the
Comite d'Etudes Technico-Commerciales des Lampes Electriques,
whose name would give the impression that it was concerned with
research problems. The Commission recognized that recommending
the establishment of competitive conditions might, because of the
industry's nature, result in concentration. The advantages of effi-
ciency and productivity arising from competition between concen-
trated enterprises was thought to be more desirable than the pre-
vious situation. The Commission recommended a transitional period
and did not condemn outright all cartel activities in return for a
stipulation that the major practices would be immediately suppressed.
It also called for a re-examination of the industry in two years.2" '
This is an industry in which there are American interests.
i. Light Bulb Base Cartel.-In this investigation the Commission
discovered the existence of a cartel different from the one under
scrutiny and on May 26, 1956, recommended the initiation of the
related investigation. The instant cartel operates on a market quota
basis, and it was recommended that, because of the needs of speciali-
zation, the cartel be legitimized under article 59 ter. It was also re-
commended that certain activities be organized to encourage normali-
zation in the industry.2 This will mean a degree of governmental
supervision over the cartel.
j. Insulated Electric Wire and Cable Cartel.-This cartel occupied
much of the Commission's time before a recommendation was made
on January 19, 1957.23 Here again is a cartel which has been scru-
20 Id. at 2, 8-9, 14.
200 The Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Comm'n, Report on the Supply of Electric
Lamps, H.M. Stationery Office (London), Oct. 4, 1951.
2'United States v. General Elec. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949).
2"2 2d Report, pp. 2, 9, 11, 14-15.
212 Id. at 2, 8, 14.213 Id. at 1, 3.
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tinized in other countries."' The recommendation provides a proba-
tionary period of four years, and the Commission must either re-
examine the cartel at the end of the period, or it may investigate
sooner. Thus, the Commission maintains effective control over the
cartel. This industry is one in which there are actually cartels at
several levels topped by an international cartel. The producers man-
ufacture other items, further complicating the investigation and
recommendation. The central control of the cartels is lodged in the
Union Professionnelle des Transports d'Energie Electrique. The Com-
mission found that the cartels utilized every classic form of "legal"
and practical control, thus effectively shackling competition. The
Commission further found that the cartel existed with the object
and effect of preventing the lowering of prices. Against this the
Commission found that the cartel had resulted in wise co-ordination
of investment, rational use of effort, and improved product quality.
Thus, as to mass-produced cables, as distinguished from those pro-
duced to special order, the Commission found that the specialization
arrangements had benefited the consumer and were legitimate. This
did not save the remainder of the ententes, and the Commission
noted that much of the improvement in the industry had come as a
result of public expenditures and experimentation dealing with the
production and transmission of electricity. Thus, the Commission also
recommended that the public services which purchase wire and
cable undertake to place their orders in a co-ordinated fashion and
improve relations with the producers, as a means toward obviating
the re-establishment of the cartel in its original form. "s"
2. Further Developments and Observations
During the period January 1, 1956, to January 31, 1957, covered
in the second report, the Commission, in addition to the actions ter-
minating in recommendations, received one matter from the Min-
ister which he subsequently called back." " Three other cases were
considered by the Commission but had not resulted in a recom-
mendation. In seven cases the investigative work had been com-
pleted, and in thirteen cases investigations were still in progress. The
statistics reflect a remarkable amount of work by the small and
painstaking staff.
214 E.g., Monopolies and Restrictive Practices Comm'n, Report on the Supply of In-
sulated Electric Wires and Cables, H.M. Stationery Office (London), June 10, 1952, pp.
50-54. See also U.N. EcoSoc Council Off. Rec. 19th Sess., Supp. No. 3A, at 8-10
(E/2675) (1955).
21 2d Report, pp. 6, 9-14.
26 Id. at 2-4.
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Certain general observations made in the first report are worthy
of note. The Commission has found that many investigated car-
tels are in reality small subdivisions of larger cartels; therefore, the
Commission would like to investigate the basic cartels and subse-
quently the general related cartels. The investigations under way re-
flect this request. The Commission also feels it would be aided by
better liaison with other government agencies that may be inter-
ested in a certain sector of commerce or industry. 1 ' As already in-
dicated, the first report closes with a plea to the Minister to change
his regulations concerning secrecy. Even though in theory stare
decisis does not apply, the Commission recognizes that knowledge
of banned practices will lead other cartels to the abandonment of
similar practices. '
In the second report the Commission notes that there has been
a breakdown of cartel control over certain industries. The Commis-
sion does not accept this fact as a defense because the cartel me-
chanism could be reactivated. In each recommendation the Com-
mission has tried to make practical and constructive suggestions that
will fit the particular problems of the industry being studied. There
is every reason to believe that the attempt has succeeded. The Com-
mission concludes the report with several requests. It restates its re-
quest for information on the ministerial disposition of its recom-
mendations so that it will not be operating in a vacuum. Further,
it devotes almost two pages to a renewed plea for publicity and an
end to secrecy by ministerial fiat. Not only reasons for this position,
but also concrete suggestions as to the form of publication are ad-
vanced. These include a censored version of a report which would
meet the objection of those who do not wish to have specific in-
dustries identified."'
Despite the veil of secrecy, there appears to be an increasingly
large and influential body of French public opinion that fully sup-
ports and respects the work of the Commission. It is inevitable that
the veil will soon be lifted. This means that not only may any ar-
rangement involving American interests (including patent agree-
ments) be subject to investigation by the Commission, but also that
the light of publicity will be applied in France as elsewhere.
The exemptions that have been granted from the ban on resale
price maintenance have been few, 2' and the most significant has
:, 1st Report, p. 23.
21 Id. at 24.
:" 2d Report, pp. 9-io, 13, 16-18.
"20 Bulletin Officiel des Services des Prix, 14eme Annee, No. 21 (Paris), Sept. 17, 1954,
p. 149, textile, Migaline; id. at 149, dressing glove; id. at 148, textile, Zephyr-Bob; id.
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been that given to perfume 2 2' on the ground that resale price main-
tenance in the American market depends on fixed prices in France.
A recent decision raising the question of the validity of present
arrangements for perfume importation into this country,2 and our
trend away from resale price maintenance may change this picture.
The August 9, 1953, decree has led to private litigation based on
an allegation that a refusal to sell is founded on a dealer's unwill-
ingness to abide by price "suggestions" of the supplier. The most
publicized case involves as defendant, Thomas-Houston, the largest
appliance maker in France, and Studios Wagram, the first French
discount house.2"' The complaint was filed on August 1, 1955,224 and
on February 25, 1958, the case was postponed until April 29, 1958,
at which time it was expected that argument would be set for
June 10, 1958.22s In the meantime, other suppliers of the plaintiff
suddenly cut off the goods contracted for December 1957, thus bank-
rupting the discount house which had orders and overhead for 100
million francs ($250,000) worth of goods."2 '
Other cases have been handled more speedily. In a case brought
by an optician on the grounds of refusal to sell, the manager of a
major manufacturer of eyeglass frames was given a suspended sen-
tence of six months imprisonment. A fine of two million francs
($5,000) was imposed, and damages of 800,000 francs ($2,000)
were awarded the plaintiff.2
A central buying agency, representing 375 dealers, sued a hair
dressing preparation firm which defended on the ground that the
dealers were not skilled in using the preparation. This was rebutted
by a showing that grocery stores, department stores, and five and
ten cent stores were supplied the product as long as they main-
at 148, textile, Lavablaine; id., lSeme Annee, No. 19 (Paris), June 22, 1955, at 111,
Frigidaire refrigerators; id., 16eme Annee, No. 7 (Paris), April 14, 1956, at 74, Arthur
Martin Stoves; id. at 74, house slippers, Dr. Jeva. Note that automobiles are price fixed
without authorization. See also notes 84 and 85 supra.
222 Bulletin Officiel des Services des Prix, 14eme Annee, No. 21 (Paris), Sept. 17, 1954,
pp. 148-49. Here are listed fifty-three perfume houses and eleven cosmetic manufacturers
whose products are exempt from the ban on fixed prices.
222 United States v. Guerlain, Inc., 155 F. Supp. 77 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
223 See note 193 supra.
124 See article entitled "La Guerre des Prix Imposes Est Declaree," Les Informations
Industrialles et Commerciales (Paris), April 13, 1956.
2aa See article entitled "Nouveau Renvoi de l'Affaire 20%," Les Echos (Paris), Feb. 26,
1958.
2 Letter from the Discount House to the Productivity Commissariat of the French
Government, Feb. 20, 1958. The letter indicates that goods were ordered under six and
twelve month contracts prior to December 1957, and that the contracts were not hon-
ored. The discount house gross in 1955 was $715,000, and in 1957 it was $2,000,000.




tained the price. The fine in this case was 100,000 francs ($250)
and the damages received by the plaintiff were 600,000 francs
($1,500).128
These cases indicate that refusal to sell will become increasingly
dangerous if the legal system is not perverted to destroy plaintiffs
by delay.
VI. CONCLUSION
There can be no doubt that the free world has come to realize
that capitalism, or some modified form of it, cannot resist the on-
slaught of Communism unless it ensures a responsible attitude toward
competition. There is growing recognition of the fact that private
restraints on business are, and can be, as harsh as those imposed
by a Commissar. The consumer wonders whether the Communist
system may not be superior to the extent that it makes a pretense
of public control over industry.
The need for control over restrictive practices and the public
demand for such controls have been recognized in many legisla-
tive enactments during the past twelve years. In some instances,
legislation has been modified after only a few years of experience
disclosed that the controls were not adequate. This trend continues,
and one can reasonably expect more controls which in practice
will reach the norms established after many years of experience
under our antitrust laws. Already one can see that in some ways
foreign legislation is even more strict than ours, and in some cases
the amount of governmental control over business far exceeds the
most violent nightmare of the American businessman. The possi-
bility for firm regional controls exists in the Common Market,
dependent only upon the will of the administrators and the poli-
ticians of the member states.
The increased use of publicity cannot be discounted. There is
already evidence that at least one international organization, the
European Productivity Agency, contemplates the creation of an in-
ternational documentation service dealing with restrictive business
practices. Full interchange of public information will avoid much
duplication of effort in investigation and afford profitable leads for
other investigations. There is no doubt that publicity and the pos-
sibility of governmental interference with daily business activities,
.2 See article entitled "Dans Quels Cas Peut-On Justifier un Refus de Vente?," Les
Echos (Paris), March 3, 1958.
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profits and dividends will serve to discourage many enterprises from
engaging in restrictive business practices.
It has been the good fortune of the writer to work with most
of those responsible for the development and administration of Euro-
pean restrictive business practices controls. The group includes top-
notch lawyers, economists, and administrators, all of whom are
able and affable. If one needs to deal with any of them, he will find
them scrupulously fair and forthright. They are men of broad prac-
tical experience dedicated to the idea that free enterprise must sur-
vive. They are men of vision who do not lose sight of reality. In
their hands the future of free enterprise is safe, and Americans
operating abroad will benefit from their advice and counsel.
